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Military Instructions,
WRITTEN BY THE
KING of PRUSSIA,
FOR THE
GENERALS of his ARMY:

Being His Majesty's own
C O M M E N T A R I E S
On his former **C A M P A I G N S.**

TOGETHER WITH
SHORT INSTRUCTIONS
For the Use of his
L I G H T T R O O P S.

Illustrated with **COPPER-PLATES.**

Translated by an **OFFICER.**

L O N D O N:
Printed for **T. BECKET** and **P. A. DE HONDT,**
in the Strand. **MDCC LXII.**

Military Institutions

WRITTEN BY THE

KING OF PRUSSIA

FOR THE

GENERALS OF HIS ARMY

During his Majesty's own

COMMENTS ON HIS FORMER CAMPAIGNS

TOGETHER WITH

SHORT INSTRUCTIONS

For the Use of his

LIGHT TROOPS


Illustrated with Copper Plates

Translated by an OFFICER



L O N D O N

Printed for T. Baskett and A. De Haven
in the Strand, MDCCLXXII.



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P R E-



P R E F A C E.

LORD Littleton, in his dialogue between Pope and Boileau, makes our English poet, in speaking of the present king of Prussia, exclaim thus,—“ What
 “ an astonishing compass and force must
 “ there be in his mind, what an heroic
 “ tranquility and firmness of heart, that
 “ he can, one day, compose an Ode or
 “ Epistle, in the most elegant verse, and
 “ the next fight a battle, with the conduct
 “ and courage of a Gustavus Adolphus”! To
 which Boileau replies—“ I envy Voltaire so
 “ noble a subject, both for his verse and his
 “ prose. But if that Prince will write his
 “ own *Commentaries*, he will want no
 “ Historian.

This

P R E F A C E.

This volume, with which I have the pleasure to present my brethren of the English army, may, with the greatest propriety, be considered as Commentaries of the former campaigns of his Prussian Majesty; and therefore cannot fail of being both entertaining and instructive to every military reader of taste and judgment.

Our Royal Author has indeed thought fit to range his instructions under a variety of distinct heads, manifestly with a view to perspicuity; but his references to his own actions are so frequent, that it would require very little trouble to throw the whole into the form of commentaries, like those of Cæsar.

Capt. Faucit, of the guards, obliged us, some time ago, with a translation of the King of Prussia's *Regulations* for the discipline of his army; but those Regulations are calculated principally for the instruction

P R E F A C E. xi

tion of Non-commissioned and Subaltern Officers, Adjutants, and Majors: Their contents, tho' essential to the service, can only be considered as the rudiments of the art of war, and therefore it is difficult to suppose, that so sublime a genius, as his present Prussian Majesty, could possibly waste his time in composing them. He certainly did not. The Regulations were originally the work of his father, who was an excellent Adjutant, and who, tho' a man of no genius at all, by the discipline of his troops, laid the foundation of his son's greatness.

The Prussian army being obliged to act, in separate corps, and it being impossible for the King to command in person more than one of these, his Majesty sketched out the instructions which form this volume, for the use of those Generals, who should be entrusted with the command of the detached parts of his army. These instructions were delivered in MSS. to each of his
Gene-

xii P R E F A C E.

General Officers, with strict orders to preserve them carefully, and to refer to them in all cases of doubt, when it was impossible to consult the King.

By what means they have transpired, is of no importance to an English reader. If he understands the subject, he will entertain no doubt of their authenticity. Whether they came into the world under the sanction of the law, or whether they are to be considered as illegitimate, it matters not. A man's child is no less his offspring, because its mother was a whore.

But tho' the book was intended, by its author, for the use of Generals only, it will be found infinitely serviceable to those of every rank. We all entertain some hopes of rising to the top of our profession; tho' in the nature of things, but a small number of us can ever obtain even the command of a regiment. Nevertheless, the ambition of a soldier, in this respect, is un-

P R E F A C E: xiii

undoubtedly a virtue, and, very frequently, the cause of his preferment.

If officers, of an inferior rank, were to read no other books than those which treat merely of military discipline, they would find themselves very ill qualified for command, if ever they should rise to any considerable rank in the army. No man was ever born a General, no more than a Mathematician. A man may bring into the world with him a strong propensity, or genius, towards a particular art or science; but he can become master of it only by study and application. When we talk of men being born poets or painters, we mean nothing more than that nature has endowed them with certain faculties, which, if properly cultivated, will enable them to excel in those arts. Native Genius, therefore, means nothing more than a soil adapted to the produce of certain fruits, which nevertheless cannot be produced without labour and attention.

Our

Our language does not abound with books on the art of war, tho' we are sufficiently provided with treatises on military discipline. Captain Otway has indeed lately favoured us with the translation of a very excellent Essay from the French, of the celebrated Count Turpin. The French have many books upon this subject: But that which has made the most noise among them, deserves the least applause. I mean the elaborate performance of the Chevalier Folard. Beyond all doubt, he was a man of much military erudition; but he is so intolerably prolix, so full of repetition, and so extravagantly chimerical, that no reader of common understanding, can possibly attend to him with patience. I will venture to affirm, that his whole system, together with all his discoveries, might be comprized in a smaller volume than this: And I will add, that these few practical instructions, if properly attended to, will be of more real use to an officer,

P R E F A C E. xv

than the ideal impracticable manoeuvres of all the French writers that ever were published.

As to the particular contents of this work, I must beg leave to differ from the common plan of a Preface, and refer the reader to the book itself. If he has judgment, I should be glad to find him pleased with the Translation. I wish it may afford him both entertainment and profit,

And am,

his most obedient Servant,

The TRANSLATOR.

Just Published,

Neatly printed in a Pocket Size, sewed One Shilling and Sixpence.

A SHORT Account of the most common DISEASES incident to A R M I E S, viz. Coughs, Sore Throat, the Pleurisy, Peripneumony, Rheumatism and Rheumatic Pains, Intermitting Fevers, Spring Intermittents, Autumnal Intermittents, the Jaundice, the Dropsy, Vomiting, Colera Morbus; a Diarrhæa, the Dysentery, Inflammations of the Intestines, Phrenzy, Hæmorrhage of the Nose, a continued Fever, the Scurvy, the Gangrene, the Venereal Disorder, the Itch, of Worms, with the Method of Cure.

Written by Baron Van S W I E T E N,

Physician to their Imperial Majesties.

Printed for T. BECKET and P. A. de HONDT, at Tully's Head, in the Strand.

* * * The Author lays down a few simple preventive Aphorisms, and the Means of preserving the Soldiers Health: He relates the distinguishing Symptoms of the prevailing Diseases of the Camp and Army, with great Exactness, Fidelity, and Precision. The Method of Cure, which he proposes, is simple, and the Medicines choice, few in Number, and easily procured. The Tables of Medicines are those the most used in Practice, with the proper Quantities ascertained, and the Manner of their being administered prescribed. This little Volume, therefore, will prove a useful *Vade Mecum*, to Camp Surgeons and Physicians.

MILITARY INSTRUCTIONS.

ARTICLE I.

Of the Prussian troops, their defects and advantages.

THE troops in my service require infinite attention in their commanders. It is necessary to make them observe the most exact discipline, and to omit nothing that may contribute to their preservation: it is particularly requisite that they should be better subsisted than almost any other troops in Europe.

Our regiments are composed of part natives and part foreigners, who have received
A inlusting-

inlusting-money; the latter of these having no attachment wait only for the first opportunity to desert; this therefore we must endeavour to prevent.

Several of our Generals are of opinion, that one man is as good as another, and that if the vacancy be filled up, the change has no influence upon the whole; but, in this respect, my army will bear no comparison with any other.

If the place of a well disciplined soldier be supplied by another who is equally disciplined, we sustain no loss; but if a man deserts who has been constantly exercised for two years together, and be replaced by an awkward fellow, or not replaced at all, in time, the consequence will be extremely perceptible.

We have seen, by the negligence of officers in the minute branches of their duty, that some regiments have not only
been

been considerably weakened by desertion; but have entirely lost their reputation. These losses enfeeble the army at a time when it is most necessary that it should be compleat; and thus our best troops must diminish beyond resource, unless prevented by your special attention.

Though my dominions are populous, the number of men of a proper stature is not great; but even supposing it were sufficient, men are not soldiers till they are disciplined. From these considerations, one of the most essential duties of a general officer who commands an army, or a detached corps, is to prevent desertion; which must be done,

1. By not encamping too near a wood or forest, unless the situation of your enemy should require it.

2. By calling the roll several times a day.

3. By sending frequent patrols of Hussars round the environs of your camp.

A 2

4: By

4. By posting small parties of Hunters in the corn, and doubling the posts of Cavalry as soon as it grows dark in order to strengthen the chain.

5. By obliging the officers to conduct their men regularly when they go for water or straw.

6. By punishing marauders with the utmost rigour; for that is the source of every disorder.

7. By not calling in your out-guards on the day of marching till your troops have stood to their arms.

8. By strictly forbidding the men to quit their ranks during the march, and by punishing the disobedient with the utmost severity.

9. By not marching in the night, unless in cases of absolute necessity.

10. By sending patrols of Hussars to the right and left, during your passage through a wood.

11. By

11. By placing officers at the entrance and opening of every *defilé*, who shall oblige the men to take up their ranks as soon as they have passed.

12. By concealing from the soldiers every retrograde-march you may be obliged to make, under some pretext, which may keep up their spirits.

13. By being particularly careful, that your troops are in no want of bread, meat, spirits and beer.

14. When desertion shall begin to creep into a company or regiment, by making particular enquiry into the cause; by informing yourself whether the men have received their due, and whether their officers may not have been guilty of some bad practices. They must not only be just, but attentive to the discipline of their men. Perhaps it may be said, that the Colonel will take care of that; but this is not sufficient. In an army every thing should

tend towards perfection, and shew that the whole is the work of one man.

Armies are composed chiefly of indolent people: if the Commander is not constantly attentive to the duty of every individual, the machine, which being artificial cannot be perfect, will soon be dislocated, and in a little time you will have an army disciplined only in idea.

It is therefore necessary that we should be indefatigable; for we are convinced by experience, that there are many abuses which require redress, but which are never perceived by those who are inattentive to their duty.

Such continual application may appear a little hard to some of our Generals; but they will find themselves sufficiently recompenced by its consequences; for what advantages may not be expected from brave and well disciplined troops? A Commander
who

who in other nations might be thought rash, will in our army appear to act rationally; in every enterprize, he may reasonably expect all that men are capable of executing.

I have seen officers, and even private men, who, though they have been dangerously wounded, have refused to quit their ranks. With such troops it were possible to conquer the whole world, if our victories were not often as fatal to us as to the enemy. With such troops you might undertake any thing provided they were never suffered to want subsistence. Upon the march, you are certain to be before the enemy; if you attack him in a wood, you will certainly force him to retire; if you attempt to scale a mountain, you are sure to carry your point; if you attack with your Cavalry, your opponents must infallibly be cut to pieces.

But as good troops of themselves are not sufficient, and as a General may by his

ignorance lose every advantage, I shall speak, in the succeeding article, of the qualifications necessary in a general officer, and lay down some rules which I have partly learned from my own experience, and partly from that of other Commanders.

A R T. II.

Of magazines, subsistence, &c.

IT was said by a certain General, that in order to have a good army you must begin by providing well for the belly, which is the main spring of every operation. I shall divide this subject into two separate branches; in the first of which I shall mention the places where, and the manner how, to establish your magazines, and in the other I shall consider the method of using and transporting them.

The first general rule is, to establish your most considerable magazine in the rear of
your

your army, and, if possible, in a fortified place. When Silesia and Bohemia were the theatres of war, we fixed our grand magazine at Breslau, on account of the Oder, which enabled us to recruit it with facility.

If your magazines are in the front of your army, they are in danger of being lost upon the least rebuff; but if you fix them one in the rear of the other, you act prudently, and a small misfortune cannot cause your entire ruin. In the Electorate of Brandenburg, the best places for magazines are Spandau and Magdebourg: the latter on account of the Elbe, would be most convenient in case of an offensive war with Saxony; but in a war against Bohemia, Schweidnitz is the best place.

It is necessary to be very circumspect in the choice of commissaries; for if these gentlemen happen to be rascals, the state will suffer considerably: you must therefore
endeavour

endeavour to find a superintendant of known probity, who will frequently and minutely examine their proceedings.

There are two methods of forming magazines: the first is by ordering the nobility and the peasants to supply the necessary quantity of grain, for which they are paid according to the tax of the Finance-Chamber, or by deducting the sum from their contribution; but if the country happens not to abound in forage, you must agree with some *Entrepreneur* for the quantity required: this is the commissary's business, who must sign the agreement.

It is likewise necessary to construct proper vessels for transporting corn and forage.

These *Entrepreneurs* should never be employed but in cases of absolute necessity; for in general they are such meer Jews, as to enhance the price of provisions, and sell them as dear as they possibly can.

Your

Your magazines should be formed as early as possible, that your army may be provided with every thing before it takes the field. If you wait too long, you will be hindered by the ice, or by the badness of the roads from forming your magazines, except with the greatest difficulty.

Besides your regimental bread-waggons, the commissary should be provided with caissons capable of conveying a month's subsistence.

But if there are navigable rivers, we must avail ourselves of them, for without these there can be no plenty of provisions in an army.

Your waggons should be drawn by horses. We have tried oxen, but to our disadvantage. Your waggon-masters must take great care of their horses, to which particular it is necessary, that the General
should

should be attentive; for by a loss of horses the number of your waggons is diminished, and consequently the quantity of subsistence.

There is yet another reason, *viz.* that your horses not being well fed, are unable to bear fatigue, in consequence of which you will lose upon the march not only the horses themselves, but the waggons and the meal or bread they may contain. Such losses frequently repeated will disconcert the most rational projects; therefore a prudent General, knowing this detail to be important in its consequences, will not think it beneath his attention.

In a war with Saxony, you must convey your subsistence upon the Elbe, and in Silesia, upon the Oder. In Prussia you have the sea; but in Bohemia and Moravia, you must have recourse to waggons.

It

It is sometimes necessary to establish three or four magazines on the same line, as we did in Bohemia in 1742. We had one at Pardubitz, one at Nienbourg, one at Podjebrod, and another at Brandeis, that we might be able to march in a line with the enemy, and follow him to Prague, in case he had thought proper to take that rout.

During our last campaign in Bohemia, Breslau supplied Schweidnitz, and that place furnished Jaromirtz, and from thence we conveyed subsistence to the army.

Besides waggons we had several iron ovens, the number of which not being found sufficient, was afterwards augmented. You should bake bread as often as you halt. On every expedition you should be provided with bread or biscuit for ten days. Biscuit is an excellent thing; but our soldiers do not like it in their soup, and are in general unacquainted with the use of it.

When

When you march in an enemy's country, your meal must be deposited in some neighbouring town, where you will place a garrison. In the campaign of 1745, our magazine of meal was first at Neustadt, then at Jeromirtz, and afterwards at Trautenau. If we had advanced farther, our next place of security would have been Pardubitz.

I have ordered a hand-mill to be provided for each company, which they will find to be extremely useful: the soldiers who work these mills are to carry the meal to the baker, and to receive bread in return. Thus you will not only spare your magazines; but will, by this means, be frequently enabled to continue in a camp, which otherwise you would have been obliged to quit: besides, fewer convoys will be required.

Having mentioned convoys, I shall here add what is necessary upon that subject.

Your

Your escort must be stronger, or weaker, in proportion to your apprehensions from the enemy. It is proper to post detachments of Infantry in the towns, through which the convoy is to pass, in order to relieve the escort during their halt. Sometimes it is requisite to cover your convoy by strong detachments, as was the case in Bohemia.

In a mountainous, woody, or inclosed country, your convoys must be escorted by Infantry, attended by a small number of Hussars, which are to give notice of those places where the enemy may form an ambuscade. I have even employed Infantry upon this duty in an open country, and have had reason to be satisfied.

I refer you to my printed Regulations, for what concerns the detail of escorts. A General of an army can never use too much precaution for the security of his convoys: one good method is to send de-

tachments to a considerable distance in front, in order to secure the defilés, through which your convoy is to pass, and to push your escort a league from the line of march, towards the enemy. This will mask your convoy and secure it.



A R T. III.

Sutlers, beer, and gin.

WHEN you have any enterprize in view, your commissaries must order all the beer and spirits upon the road to be collected, that the army may be in no want of either, at least, during the first three or four days. As soon as you enter an enemies country, you must seize all the brewers and distillers which are to be found in the neighbourhood, and oblige them in particular to furnish gin, that the soldier may be supplied with a liquor, without which he cannot possibly exist.

As


As to the Sutlers they must be protected, particularly where the inhabitants have left the country, and where consequently provisions are not to be had for money. In that case the peasants have no right to expect lenity.

The sutlers and soldiers wives are to be sent out in search of cattle, roots, and greens; and the price of provisions must be so regulated, that the soldier may be able to buy them, and the sutler to make a reasonable profit.

I must also add, that each soldier is allowed two pounds of bread per day, and two pounds of meat per week gratis during the campaign. This is a *Douceur*, which a poor soldier well deserves; especially in Bohemia, which to an army is little better than a desert. Every convoy should be followed by some cattle for the subsistence of the private men.

B

A R T.



A R T. IV.

Of dry and green Forrage.

BY dry forrage is meant oats, barley, hay, chopt straw, &c. These are to be collected in your magazines. Care should be taken, that your oats are perfectly sound and not mouldy, otherwise your Cavalry will soon be unfit for service. Chopt straw does nothing more than fill the horses belly: it is used only because it is the custom.

The reason for collecting forrage, and forming magazines early, is either with a design to take the field before the enemy, or with a view to some expedition at a distance; but an army seldom dares attempt any thing, which may carry it too far from its magazines, so long as the horses are fed with dry forrage, because the number of carriages required is so great, that an entire
 4 province

province would not be long able to support it.

During the campaign in Silesia, my Cavalry fed entirely upon dry forrage; but then we marched only from Strehla to Schweidnitz, where we had a magazine, and then to Cracau, which was near the Brieg and the Oder.

When you would attempt a winter-expedition, your Cavalry must carry five days hay upon their own horses. If Bohemia, or Moravia, is to be the theatre of war, you must wait for the spring, or you will infallibly ruin all your Cavalry. So long as there is any corn or herbage standing, you forrage in the field, and after the harvest, in the villages.

When you take possession of a fresh camp, where you intend to continue for some time, the first thing to be done is, to reconnoitre the forrage, and after having

made an estimate of the quantity, to make a proper distribution for the number of days you intend to remain.

A grand forrage is always made under the escort of a body of Cavalry, proportioned to the vicinity and power of the enemy. These forrages are sometimes general, and sometimes by wings.

Your foraging party always assembles upon the road, sometimes upon the flanks, and sometimes in the rear of the army. The Hussars have the advanced guard. If it is in open country, they are followed by the Cavalry; but if the country be inclosed, the Infantry march first. A fourth part of your forragers follow the advanced guard, then a detachment of the escort consisting both of Cavalry and Infantry; these are succeeded by another party of forragers, which are also covered by a second detachment of troops, and so on alternately: a troop of Hussars close the column. Upon
all

all escorts the Infantry are to take their cannon along with them, and the foragers are to have their carbines, and side-arms.

As soon as the party arrives at the place where they are to forage, they are to form a chain, posting the Infantry near the villages, behind the hedges, and in hollow ways, with small parties of Cavalry between each, keeping a reserve in the center, ready to support any part of the chain, where the enemy may attempt to pierce. The Hussars will be ordered to skirmish, and amuse the enemy in the mean time. As soon as the chain is formed, you will divide the field, allotting an equal proportion to each regiment. The respective officers are to take care, that the men make their trusses large, and bind them well.

When the horses are loaded, the foragers are to return to camp, attended by small escorts, and as soon as they have

quitted the field, the troops which form the chain are to assemble and form the rear-guard, followed by the Hussars.

The manner of foraging in the villages is the same, with this difference only that the Infantry must be posted round the village with the Cavalry in their rear. It is proper to forage only one village at a time, that the troops which form the chain may not be too much dispersed.

Foraging in mountainous countries is attended with most difficulty. In this case the escort must be composed of Infantry and Hussars only.

When you are encamped near the enemy, if you intend to continue any time, you must endeavour as soon as possible to get possession of the forrage between the two armies. You will then forage in a circle of two leagues round your encampment, beginning with the fields at the greatest distance,

distance, and reserving the nearest to the last.

When you order a grand forrage, it is best not to take too large an extent, but rather to order two grand forages immediately after each other: thus your chain being closer your foragers will be better secured, and less liable to be surpris'd.



A R T. V.

Of the knowledge of a Country.

THERE are two methods of acquiring this knowledge: the first is, to study attentively the map of the province, which you intend to make the seat of war, and make yourself perfectly acquainted with the name of every city, river and mountain.

Having formed a general idea of the country, you must then be more particular,

and inform yourself concerning the great roads, the situation of towns, whether they are defensible with a little repairing, on what side they may be attacked in case they should fall into the hands of the enemy, and what garrison will be necessary for their defence.

You must be provided with the plans of fortified towns, in order to know their strong and weak parts. You must also be certain as to the course of rivers, their depth, how high they are navigable, and where they may be forded. It is likewise necessary to know, what rivers are impassible in the spring, and dry in summer: this knowledge should extend even to the principal morasses of the country.

In a flat country it is necessary to distinguish the fertile from the barren parts of it, and to know what routs the enemy may take, and what may be yours from one town or river to another. You must
also

also be acquainted with every spot of ground proper for an encampment upon each rout.

The knowledge of a flat and open country is very easily attained; but that of an inclosed, woody, or mountainous one is attended with great difficulty: this however is to be acquired in the following manner.

You take your map in your hand, attended by some of the old men of the neighbouring villages, the game-keepers and shepherds; with these you ascend the hights, and enquire of them every particular relative to all the objects within your view.

It is necessary to be very minute in your enquiries concerning the roads, that you may know, not only in how many columns it is possible to march, but also in order to form projects, and to know by what rout it were best to force the enemy, if he should
 encamp

encamp in that neighbourhood, or in what manner you may turn his flank in case he should change his position.

One of your principal objects is, to reconnoitre those situations which are naturally strong, in case it should be necessary to act defensively, as well as the fields of battle and strong posts which may be occupied by the enemy.

Of all these particulars you must acquire a perfect knowledge, as also of every defile and strong position in the whole country. You must likewise reflect maturely on every possible manoeuvre, that you may not be embarrassed in case it should become the theatre of war.

These reflexions are of infinite importance, and therefore ought to be properly combined and digested. If you do not succeed in your first survey, you must explore the country a second time, and examine

amine every circumstance with the utmost accuracy and attention.

You will remember this general rule in chusing the ground for an encampment, whether you act offensively or defensively, that it must not be at too great a distance from wood and water ; that the front must be secure, and the rear open.

If it is necessary to reconnoitre a neighbouring district, and if circumstances will not permit it to be done in the manner above directed, you must send intelligent officers under various pretences, and even order them to be disguised, if it cannot be otherwise effected. They must be instructed in the particular observations, which they are to make, and on their return, you are to mark in the map the purport of their discoveries ; but whenever it is possible, it is always best to see things with one's own eyes.

A R T.



A R T. VI.

Glance of the Eye.

THE military glance of the eye may be reduced to two particulars. The first comprehends the talent of judging at one view, what number of troops a piece of ground will contain: this can only be acquired by practice. After having marked out several camps, the eye becomes capable of measuring so exactly, that you will seldom fail in your estimate.

The other talent, which is of a superior nature, consists in conceiving, at first sight, every possible advantage which the ground will afford. This talent may be acquired, and carried to a great degree of perfection, by those who are born with a happy genius for the art of war. The basis of this glance of the eye is the knowledge of fortification, whose

whose rules are to be applied to every position of an army. An experienced General will avail himself of every height, defilé, hollow road, morafs, &c.

In the space of two square leagues it may be possible to take two hundred different positions. A good General will at the first glance perceive that which is most advantageous. He will ascend every eminence in order to explore and reconnoitre the country. The same rules of fortification will shew him the weakness of the enemy's order of battle. It is also of great importance after he has taken his position, if time will permit, to know the precise extent of the ground which he occupies, and the number of paces it contains.

There are many other advantages to be drawn from the rules of fortification; as for example, to chuse your heights and possess them in such a manner, that they may not be commanded by others; that
your

your flanks may be covered and defended; that each post may be capable of defence; and to avoid those in which a brave officer cannot maintain his ground without risking his reputation. By the same rules you will judge of the defects in the position of your enemy, whether from the disadvantage of his situation, or the injudicious distribution of his troops. These reflections lead me to consider, in what manner you are to dispose your troops in order to take the greatest advantage of your situation.



A R T. VII.

Distribution of Troops.

THE knowledge and the choice of ground are undoubtedly very essential articles; but it is also necessary, that we should know how to dispose our troops so as to give them every advantage of their situation. Our Cavalry, which are trained to

to attack with great celerity, cannot act except on a plain; whilst, on the contrary, our Infantry may be employed in every situation: its fire is its defence, and its bayonet chiefly useful in acting offensively.

It is usual to begin with the defensive, because it is proper to take all requisite precautions for the security of your camp, where the vicinity of the enemy gives him the power of bringing on an action whenever he thinks fit.

Most of our modern orders of battle are old. We continue to tread in the steps of our forefathers, without any regard to ground or situation; for which reason their rules are by us generally wrong applied.

The first thing to be considered in forming a line of battle is the ground on which you are to engage. We chuse a plain for our Cavalry; but that is not sufficient: for if that plain should happen to be no more than

than a thousand paces in front, skirted by a wood, in which we will suppose the enemy to have posted some Infantry, under the cover of whose fire their Cavalry may rally; in that case, it is necessary to alter your disposition, by marching a body of Infantry to the extremity of each wing, that your Cavalry may likewise be supported.

Sometimes the entire Cavalry is posted upon one wing; sometimes it forms the second line; and at other times the extremity of each wing is covered by a brigade or two of Infantry.

The most advantageous posts are heights, church-yards, hollow roads, and fossées: if your troops are so disposed as to make the utmost advantage of these, you need never fear being attacked.

If you post your Cavalry behind a morass, it will be of no service; and if it forms too near a wood, in which it is possible that the
 enemy

enemy may have lodged a body of troops, they will gall your cavalry, which being unable to make any defence, will soon be thrown into disorder. The same inconveniency will happen to your Infantry if advanced into a plain, if its wings be left exposed; for the enemy will not fail to take advantage of your mistake, and attack you in a part where you are incapable of defence.

Our manœuvres must be chiefly governed by the nature of the country. When I am among mountains, my Cavalry forms my second line without any in the first, except in some particular parts where it can act with ease, and a few squadrons to flank the enemy in case I should be attacked.

It is a general rule, that in every well conducted army there is a reserve of Cavalry if it be in an open country; and if in the reverse, a reserve of Infantry with some squadrons of Dragoons and Hussars.

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The art of properly disposing your troops is to distribute them in such a manner as that each may act with freedom, with regard to itself, and be of general utility to the whole. Villeroi, who perhaps was ignorant of this maxim, deprived himself, on the plain of Ramillies, of his whole left wing, which having a morass in its front, could not act or sustain the right.



A R T. VIII.

Of camps.

IN order to know if you are well encamped, you must consider whether by a small movement you will oblige the enemy to make a considerable one; or whether after one march he will not be obliged to make a second. Those which make the shortest manœuvres are the best encamped.

The

The General of an army ought himself to chuse his camp; for on that choice frequently depends the success of his enterprises, as it often becomes the field of battle.

This branch of the art of war requires many observations; I shall therefore be particular on this subject, but without taking any notice of the manner in which the troops are to be disposed, refering you to the *Regulations* already in your hands. I shall here confine myself to those particulars which immediately concern a general officer.

In the choice of every camp, there are two principal objects to be had in view, *viz* the one offensive, and the other defensive. The camp in which an army first assembles is of the first class; in these your sole attention is the conveniency of the troops: they should encamp in small sepa-

rate corps, near your magazine, and so as to be capable of uniting in a short time. As these camps are generally distant from the enemy, you have little to fear. The king of England, without having taken this precaution, imprudently encamping on the banks of the Main, opposite to the French army, was in great danger of being beaten at Dettingen.

Wood and water, as I have before observed, are the first things to be remembered in marking out a camp. It is our custom to inclose our camps with an intrenchment, as was the practice with the Romans, with a design not only to prevent insults during the night from the enemies light troops, which are very numerous, but also to hinder desertion; for I have always observed, how ridiculous soever it may seem, that when our redans were connected by lines quite round our camp, we had less desertion than when that precaution was neglected.

Camps of repose are those in which we either wait for forage, or watch the enemy in order to regulate our motions by his. Repose being the sole object in these camps, they are to have a river or morafs in front, so as to render them absolutely impene- trable. Our camp at Strehla was of this nature.

If the river, or rivulet, in the front of your camp, has not a sufficient depth of water, it must be dammed, so as to render it impassable.

In these peaceable encampments, having nothing to fear from the enemy, an active General will turn his whole attention to the discipline of his troops: he will examine whether the service be performed with minute accuracy and according to the orders; whether the officers upon guard are vigilant and sufficiently instructed in every particular of their duty; whether

the guards of Cavalry and Infantry are posted according to the orders which I have heretofore given.

The Infantry must exercise three times a week, the recruits daily, and he will frequently give orders for the whole line to manoeuvre.

The Cavalry must also be exercised when they are not employed in foraging: the General will be particularly attentive that the recruits and young horses are well disciplined. He must be acquainted with the exact state of each corps. He must even visit the horses, praise the officers who have been careful of them, and severely reprimand those by whom they have been neglected. He must not believe that a numerous army will animate itself; it consists of a great number of idle, indolent, careless people, and it is the business of a General to put them in motion, and oblige them to perform their duty.

In

In permanent camps of this sort, to employ our time in the manner I have prescribed will be of great utility; order and discipline being thus established, will be easily preserved during the rest of the campaign.

Camps for foraging are sometimes near, and sometimes at a distance from the enemy: I shall speak only of the first. For this purpose you chuse a fertile country, and your camp must be strong either by nature or art; for a party of foragers are in fact a detachment sent out against the enemy. You sometimes employ a sixth, and sometimes even half of your army on this service; so that you are liable to be attacked to great disadvantage, unless you are secure in the strength of your camp. But even supposing that your situation be ever so strong, and that in all probability you have nothing to fear from the enemy, yet there are certain precautions which ought never to be neglected.

You must carefully conceal the time when, and the place where you intend to forage, and communicate your orders to the General, who is to command the detachment, not till late the night before.

It is necessary upon these occasions to detach as many small parties as ever you can, that you may be well informed concerning the motions of the enemy, and if you have no very important reasons for the contrary, you will forrage at the same time with them, as you will then have less to fear: not that you are to depend too securely on this; for the enemy perceiving that, in this case, your motions are directed in consequence of theirs, might order a forrage, and cause the troops to return and attack you unawares.

The camp of prince Charles of Lorraine near Konigingraetz, was by nature impregnable, and consequently very proper
for

for foraging; as was likewise ours at Chlom, it being rendered strong by the *abatis*, by which I had secured our right wing, and the redoubts which were constructed along the front of my Infantry.

It is necessary to entrench your camp when you besiege a town, or defend a pass, in order to supply the natural defects in your situation and secure you from insult.

The rule which a General should observe in constructing his entrenchments is, to turn every circumstance of ground to his advantage, and to make the best use of rivers, morasses, inundations, and *abatis* which may render his line difficult of access; but it is always prudent to avoid being too extensive, as in fact, it is not these obstacles, but the troops, which are to stop the enemy.

I should always be careful to limit my entrenchments so as to be able to line them
with

with a chain of batallions, and to have a reserve ready to sustain those which may be attacked. An *abatis* is of no service, unless it be defended by Infantry.

It is principally requisite that the extremities of your line of countervallation be well secured: it frequently happens, that they touch upon a river; in that case, you must carry your fossée a good way into the water, and make it so deep as not to be fordable. If this precaution be neglected, you run a risk of being flanked.

Your lines must be so constructed as that no one point can be attacked by the enemy without his being exposed to five or six cross-fires. Intrenchments which are constructed for the defence of narrow passes, among mountains, &c. require infinite precaution; their flanks must be extremely well secured: for this purpose it is common to construct redouts upon each flank, and sometimes the line itself is formed by redouts,

douts, that the troops which defend it, may be in no danger of being taken in flank.

A General who is master of his profession, will oblige the enemy to attack that part of his fortification to which he has added considerable strength by increasing the width and depth of the fossée, with the additional defence of chevaux de frise; by strengthening the parapet so as to render it cannon proof, and by sinking pits in the front of those parts, which are most exposed.

But for covering a siege, I prefer an army of observation rather than an entrenched camp; for experience hath taught us, that the old method of entrenching, is far from being a sufficient security. Before Arras, the prince of Conde's entrenchments were forced by Turenne, and Conde in his turn, forced those of Turenne, before Valenciennes. After that, these two great masters in the art of war covered their sieges by an army of observation.

I shall

I shall now speak of defensive camps, which are strong only by their situation, and which have no other design than to prevent an attack.

If such situations are to answer the purpose intended, the front and flanks must be equally strong, but the rear entirely open. Such for instance are those heights which have an extensive front, and whose flanks are covered by morasses, as was prince Charles's camp at Marchwitz, whose front was covered by a river, and wings by deep valleys; or that which we occupied at Konopist, in the year 1744.

It is also common to shelter an army under the cannon of a strong town, which was the case with marshal Neuperg, who after his defeat at Mollwitz, chose an excellent position under the walls of Neiss. Now tho' a General who is in possession of such camps may be in no danger of an attack,

attack, nevertheless he may be obliged to move, if the enemy should endeavour to pass him; therefore it is necessary, that he should make proper dispositions, so that he may be able, whenever he should think fit, to retire to some other strong camp in his rear.

In the kingdom of Bohemia, these camps are very frequent, and a General may be often obliged to have recourse to them, as it is a country in which every inch of ground may be disputed.

I must again repeat, that a General should be exceeding careful not to commit an irreparable fault in the choice of his situation, or to confine his army in places whence it cannot issue, except through a defilé; for if his opponent be a man of abilities, he will certainly block him up, and not being able to fight for want of room, he must submit to the greatest disgrace that can happen to a soldier, which

is that of being obliged to lay down his arms.

In the choice of camps which are designed to cover a country, less regard is paid to the strength of the place itself, than to the parts through which the enemy may attempt to penetrate; these are to be secured by your army: yet you are not to occupy the entire opening through which he may endeavour to pass, but rather that which leads to his purpose, which you may defend without danger, and in which you may possibly increase his apprehensions. In a word you are to possess such posts as may oblige the enemy to move in a large circle, and where you may be able to disconcert his projects by inconsiderable movements.

The camp at Neustadt, covers all lower Silesia, from any attempt of an army in Moravia. Your proper position is to have the town and the river in your front. If the enemy should endeavour to penetrate

between Ottmachau and Glatz, you need but pass to an advantageous camp between Neifs and Ziegenhals, and you will entirely cut him off from Moravia.

In the same apprehension the enemy will not dare to take the rout of Cosel: for if I post myself between Troppau and Jagern-dorf, where there are many advantageous positions to be found, I shall effectually intercept his convoys.

There is also a camp of equal importance between Liebau and Schoemberg, which covers lower Silesia from any irruption from Bohemia.

In such positions it will be necessary to observe, as much as possible, the rules which I have laid down: to these I will add another, which is, when you have a river in front, not to suffer any tents to be pitched upon your intended field of battle, within half musket-shot of the front of
your

your camp. The Marsh of Brandenburg is a country which is incapable of being covered by a camp, because there is a plain of more than six leagues in extent. To defend it from Saxony we must occupy the town of Wittenberg, and encamp there, or follow the plan of our expedition in 1745. Towards Hanover the camp at Werben covers the Electorate of Brandenburg.

The wings of your army, whether acting offensive or defensively, ought always to be carefully secured; for nothing can be expected, even from the best troops in the world, if their flanks are exposed. Our camp at Czaflau, before the battle in 1742, had this defect.

It is a maxim with us to occupy the villages in our front, and upon our flanks, but to withdraw the troops before an action; for in our own country, as well as in that of our neighbours, the houses being of wood, and ill built, if the enemy should
set

set fire to them, the troops must infallibly perish: but where there happens to be a church-yard or buildings with stone-walls, which are not adjacent to the wooden houses, we may frequently think fit to act otherwise.

But it being a general rule with us not to wait till we are attacked, no such posts are to be occupied unless they are in your front, or advanced before your line of battle, upon the flanks of your army: they will then support your attack, and greatly gall the enemy during the action.

Nothing can be more essential to your security than to cause the rivers and morasses, which may be in your front or on your flanks, to be founded, that you may not have a false dependence on some part which may be fordable.

Villars was beaten at Malplaquet; because he thought the morass upon his right was

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impracticable, which our troops passed and took him in flank. Every thing should be examined with one's own eyes, without supposing that this minute attention is of no importance.



A R T. IX.

In what manner to secure your Camp.

THE Infantry are to guard the front of the first line. If there be a river, you are to plant piquets along its banks. The piquets of the second line are to guard the rear of the camp. The piquets are to be covered by redans, which are to be joined by a slight intrenchment, and thus your camp will be fortified in the manner of the Romans. The villages on the flanks of your army are to be occupied, as also those which command the avenues to your camp to the distance of half a league.

The

The guards of Cavalry are to be posted according to the orders in the *Regulations*. Eighty squadrons generally mount only three hundred men, except when we are very near the enemy, as was the case before the battle of Hohen-Friedberg; on our approach to Schweidnitz, and when we entered Lusatia on our march to Naumburg.

Your advanced guards should be composed of different troops; as for instance, 2000 Hussars, 1500 Dragoons, and 2000 Grenadiers. Whenever you advance a separate corps in the front of your army, the General who commands it should be a man of abilities; and as he is not detached with an intention to fight, but to observe the enemy, he should be well skilled in the choice of ground, and always encamped behind a wood, or defilé, occupied by his own troops. He must send out frequent patrols, that he may be hourly informed of what passes in the enemy's camp.

In the mean time, the Hussars which remain with the army are to patrol in the rear and on the flanks of your camp, so that no precaution may be wanting to secure you from surprize.

If any considerable body of troops should attempt to get between the army and the rear-guard, you may suppose they have formed a design against the latter, and therefore it must be immediately supported.

That I may omit nothing essential to this subject, I will add that the Generals who are cantoned, are to occupy the villages only which are between the two lines; they will then have nothing to fear.

A R T. X.

How and wherefore Detachments are to be sent.

IT is an old maxim in the art of war, that he who divides his force, will be beaten in detachment. When you are

are resolved to give battle, endeavour to assemble your whole strength: you cannot possibly employ your troops to greater advantage. This rule is so well founded, that those Generals who have deviated from it, have almost always had cause to repent their conduct.

Albemarle's detachment, which was beaten at * Oudenarde, was the cause why the great Eugene lost the whole campaign. Stahremberg's being separated from the English troops, lost the battle of Villaviciosa in Spain.

In the late campaigns of the Austrians in Hungary, they suffered greatly by their detachments: prince Hilburghausen was defeated at Banjaluka, and General Wallis was repulsed on the banks of the Timok. The Saxons lost the battle of Kesselsdorf, because they were not joined as they might have been by prince Charles. I should

* Albemarle was beaten at Denain.

have been beaten, and I deserved it, at Sohr, if the abilities of my Generals, and the intrepidity of my troops had not saved me from that misfortune. Probably I shall be asked, whether it be invariably improper to make detachments? To this I answer, that it is always a very delicate manoeuvre, and never to be hazarded except with very sufficient reason, and critical propriety.

But you are not on any account to make detachments when you design to act offensively. If you are in an open country, and have possession of a few towns, you will detach no troops but such as are necessary to secure your convoys.

Whenever Bohemia, or Moravia, is the theatre of war, you will be obliged to make considerable detachments in order to secure your subsistence. The chain of mountains, which your convoys are obliged to pass, require that you should detach a considerable body of troops, which are to remain encamped

encamped there till you have collected subsistence sufficient for some months, and are become master of some fortification in the enemy's country, where you may establish your magazines.

While these troops remain detached, you will continue fixed in some advantageous camp. In speaking of detachments, I do not comprehend your advanced guard, which ought never to be pushed too far from the army.

When you are obliged to act upon the defensive, you will sometimes be under a necessity of making detachments. The troops which I detached in Upper Silesia, were securely posted in the neighbourhood of fortified towns, according to the rule above mentioned.

The officers who are intrusted with the command of detached corps should be brave, steady, and prudent. The commander in

chief will give them general instructions; but their own abilities must direct them when to advance and when to retire before the enemy, as circumstances may require. They must always retreat before a superior force, but they must also know how to make the best advantage of their own superiority. Sometimes they must retire in the night at the approach of the enemy, and when he supposes them entirely fled, return to the charge and repulse him in their turn. They must absolutely despise any attack of irregulars.

An officer who commands the detachments, must not think of an enterprize against the enemy, till he has first provided for his own security. If he intends to enjoy any repose himself, he must begin by frequently disturbing that of the enemy: if he succeeds in two or three of his first attempts, they will then content themselves with acting upon the defensive.

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If these detachments are not posted at too great a distance from the army, they may preserve a communication by means of an intermediate town.

A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachments. Those Generals who have had but little experience, attempt to secure all; whilst those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater. He that grasps at every thing, seldom succeeds at all.

The most essential object of attention is the army of the enemy. You must penetrate into its designs, and oppose them with all your might. In the year 1745, we abandoned Upper Silesia, to be pillaged by the Hungarians, that we might be able more effectually to oppose the designs of prince Charles, and we made no detachments

ments till after we had defeated his army : General Naffau then, in fourteen days, drove the Hungarians entirely out of Upper Silesia.

It is the practice of some Generals to detach part of their troops immediately before they attack the enemy, with orders to fall upon their rear during the action; but this is a very dangerous manoeuvre, because these detachments frequently mistake their rout, and by that means arrive either too soon or too late. Charles XII. detached part of his army on the eve of the battle of Pultawa : the detachment mistook its rout, and his army was defeated. Prince Eugene failed in his attempt to surprise Cremona, because the detachment commanded by prince Vaudemont, which was to have forced the Pogate, came too late.

No detachments are to be made on the day of battle, unless it were in imitation of Turenne, near Colmar, where presenting
his

his first line to the Elector Frederick William, he marched the second through defiles, turned his flanks, attacked and repulsed him; or like marshal de Luxembourg, who at the battle of Fleurus, in the year 1690, turned the flanks of prince Waldeck, who by that means was defeated.

Be it therefore a general rule, to make no detachments before a battle to more than half a league from the army, unless such as are necessary to secure your convoys: and that to detach half, or one third of your army, is always dangerous and generally inexcusable.



A R T. XI.

Stratagems.

IN the art of war we sometimes put on the skin of the Lion, and sometimes that of the Fox. Strength often gives way to stratagem.

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The stratagems of war are so infinitely various, that to enumerate them were impossible; they have however all the same object in view, which is to deceive the enemy and to engage him to take some false step: they are practised to conceal your real design under the appearance of doing what you never intend.

In assembling your troops, you may cause them to make several countermarches in order to alarm the enemy, and mislead him as to the part where you intend to penetrate.

If it be in a country where there are several fortresses, you may situate your camp in such a manner, as to threaten two or three places at the same time. If the enemy should garrison them all, he will by that means weaken his army, and you may then attack him to advantage; but if he should throw troops into one of them only,

you will direct your march toward that which is exposed, and besiege it.

If it be your design to attack any considerable post, or to pass a river, you must draw off your army to some distance from the object in view in order to draw the enemy after you; and having made the necessary disposition, you face about, steal a march, and execute your project without delay.

If you are desirous of coming to action, and the enemy declines it, you are to endeavour to persuade him that your army is diminished, or that you are afraid of engaging. I practised this deception before the battle of Hohen-Friedberg, by repairing the road as if I had an intention to march in four columns towards Breslau, upon the approach of prince Charles; his natural confidence drew him into the plain, and he was defeated.

If

If you chuse to appear weaker than you are, contract your camp, make small detachments, and report them considerable; this may tempt the enemy to despise your numbers and quit his advantage. If I had designed to take Koniggratz and Pardubitz, in the campaign of 1745, I should have had only two days march thro' the county of Glatz; for prince Charles would infallibly have drawn off his army and abandoned Bohemia to cover Moravia, whence he drew all his subsistence. The enemy will always be jealous of any attempts upon those places which communicate with the capital, or which contain his magazines.

If you have no inclination to fight, you must endeavour to magnify your force, and seem by no means afraid to look the enemy in the face. The Austrians are great adepts in this art; it is from them you must learn it.

In support of your apparent resolution, you must frequently declare your desire of coming to action, and your intention of executing the most daring enterprizes. This may possibly damp the enemy so as to make him continue upon the defensive.

A most essential branch of the art of defensive war, is the choice of advantageous posts, which are to be resolutely defended to the last extremity. When you are obliged to retreat, the second line retires first, followed insensibly by the first, and having défilés in your rear, you are in no great danger from the pursuit.

Even during your retreat, it is possible to assume such oblique positions as to perplex the enemy with regard to your design, and to give you an opportunity, during his irresolution, to accomplish your intention.

Another

Another stratagem in the art of war, is to present a very extensive front to the enemy: if he happens to mistake the sham-attack for the real one, he is inevitably lost.

By stratagem you may sometimes persuade the enemy to make considerable detachments, and then attack him to advantage.

One of the most efficacious stratagems, is at the time when the armies are marching into winter-quarters, to retire with a design of advancing more effectually. With this view, you canton your army in such a manner as that it may reassembled in a very short time; you then march unexpectedly, force the enemy's winter-quarters, and by that means, in the space of a fortnight, retrieve the misfortunes of a whole campaign.

Read the two last campaigns of Turenne, and study them with attention: they are the


the *ne-plus-ultra* of modern stratagems. Those of the ancients are now practised only by our light troops: they form ambuscades, and by a feigned flight, endeavour to draw the enemy into a défilé, and then put them to the sword. But there are now few Generals who are weak enough to be decoyed into such snares. Nevertheless Charles XII. was deceived in this manner; but it was owing to the treachery of one of the Cossack chiefs. The same thing happened to Peter I. on the banks of the Pruth, owing to a prince of that country: both these had promised subsistence which they could not furnish.

As I have been very explicit, in my *Regulations*, on the manner of making war in detachment, I refer those who are desirous of refreshing their memories in that particular, to that book, having nothing material to add upon the subject.

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As to what concerns the art of obliging the enemy to make detachments, it may be fully acquired by studying the admirable campaign of marshal Luxembourg against the king of England in Flanders in 1690, which was terminated by the battle of Neerwinde.



A R T. XII.

Of Spies, their use on every occasion, and the manner of obtaining constant intelligence of the enemy.

IF it were possible always to penetrate the intentions of the enemy, it would be no difficult matter to maintain a superiority, even with an inferior army. Every General endeavours to obtain this advantage, but very few succeed.

Spies may be divided into four classes.

1. Common spies, which are such by profession.

fession. 2. Double spies. 3. Spies of consequence : and 4. Those which are forced into that unhappy employment.

Common spies, such as peasants, burgers, priests, &c. which are sent into the enemy's camp, can be employed only to inform you where the enemy is. Their reports are generally so confused, and obscure, that they serve only to increase your uncertainty.

The report of deserters is seldom more to be depended on ; for a soldier knows what passes in the regiment to which he belongs, and nothing farther ; and as for Hussars, as they are generally detached from the body of the army, they are for the most part totally ignorant of its position. Notwithstanding this, it is proper to write down their several reports ; for otherwise it is impossible to reap any advantage from them.

Double spies are of service in carrying false intelligence to the enemy. I remember an Italian spy, employed by the Austrians at Schmiedeberg, who was made to believe that we were retiring to Breslau, upon the approach of prince Charles, who was deceived by the report.

Prince Eugene paid a considerable pension for a long time to the postmaster at Versailles, who constantly opened the dispatches from the French Court, and transmitted a copy of them to him, which he generally received before the Commander of the French army.

Luxemburg bribed one of the Secretaries of the king of England, by which means he was informed of all their resolutions. The king discovered the treachery, and made all the advantage of it, which so delicate an affair would afford. He obliged the traitor to write to Luxemburg, and
 8 inform

inform him that the next day the army would make a grand forrage, in consequence of which the French army was very near being surprized, and would infallibly have been defeated, if the troops had not behaved with uncommon resolution.

It is very difficult to employ such Spies in the Austrian army; not that they are more difficult to be found than among other nations, but because their army is constantly enveloped by Hussars, as with a cloud, who rifle every passenger. This consideration gave rise to my idea of gaining over some of their officers of Hussars, by which means it were possible to carry on a correspondence; for after the Hussars of each army have skirmished a little, it is common for them tacitly to consent to a kind of suspension of hostilities: during that time letters might conveniently be delivered and received.

When you have a mind to deceive the enemy by false intelligence, one method is

to dispatch an intelligent soldier, as a deserter, who reports what you would have them believe, and then returns with what intelligence he can gather. He may also distribute papers among their troops to encourage desertion.

When you find it very necessary, yet very difficult, to gain any intelligence of the enemy, there is another expedient, tho' a cruel one. You take a rich Burgher, possessed of lands, a wife and children. You oblige him to go to the enemy's camp, as if to complain of hard treatment, and to take along with him as his servant, a spy who speaks the language of the country; assuring him at the same time that in case he does not bring the spy back with him, after having remained a sufficient time in the enemy's camp, that you will set fire to his house, and massacre his wife and children. I was forced to have recourse to this cruel expedient when we were encamped at ——. It answered my purpose.

To

To all this I must add, that in rewarding your spies it is necessary to be generous, and even prodigal. A man who risks his neck to serve you, deserves to be amply rewarded.



A R T. XIII.

Of certain Signs by which the Intention of the Enemy may be discovered.

THE most infallible indication of the enemy's designs, previous to his taking the field, is the place where he deposits his magazines. If the Austrians, for instance, form their magazines at Ollmutz, you may conclude that they have a design upon Upper Silesia; if, on the contrary, Koenigingratz be the place, Schweidnitz may expect to be attacked. When the Saxons attempted to penetrate into our Electorate, their magazine shewed the rout

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they

they intended to march; for Zittau, Goerlitz, and Guben, are in the direct road to Crossen.

The first thing, therefore, necessary to be known is, the places where the enemy has established his magazines. The French have sometimes formed double magazines, in order to keep the enemy in suspense.

When the Austrians are encamped, 'tis not difficult to discover their design to march; for it is their general custom to cook their kettles on that day particularly. If therefore you perceive, at five or eight o'clock in the morning, more smoke than ordinary in their camp, you may be pretty certain they intend to move.

When the Austrians have a design to fight, it is their custom to call in all their large detachments of light troops; therefore when you observe this, you must be upon your guard.

If

If when you attack a post of Hungarian troops, they stand their ground, you may be assured that their army is at hand ready to support them.

If the enemy's light troops should get between your army and the corps which you have detached, you may conclude that they have a design upon that detachment, and you will take your measures accordingly.

If you have always the same General to contend with, you will in time be able, by repeated observations on his disposition and manner of acting, to foresee his designs.

After having duly considered the country which is to be the theatre of war, the strength of the army under your command, the safety of your magazines, the strength of the towns, and the means which the enemy may employ against them,

them, the damage which you may receive from their light troops if they should take post upon your flanks or in your rear, or in case they should be employed to make a diversion; I say, having maturely reflected on all these points, and remembering that a wise enemy will act in such a manner as to do you all the mischief in his power, your sole business is to thwart his proceedings.



A R T. XIV.

Of our own Country, neutral Countries, an Enemy's Country, difference of Religion, and what Conduct these different Objects require.

IF I was solely attentive to my own glory, I would always make my own country the theatre of war; for there every inhabitant is a spy, so that 'tis impossible for the enemy to take a single step of which

which I am not instantly informed, and I can without danger harrafs and perplex him with large detachments as often as I think fit. If he should be defeated, great part of the scattered remains of his army would be destroyed by the incensed peasants, as was the case after the battle of Fohrbelin, in which not so many Swedes were killed, as were afterwards murdered by the peasants. After the battle of Hohen-Friedberg, the inhabitants of the mountains in Silesia brought us a considerable number of the scattered Austrians.

When we make war in a neutral country, there appears to be no advantage on either side; it therefore depends upon each army to try which of the two can most effectually obtain the confidence and friendship of the inhabitants. With this intention it is necessary to preserve the strictest discipline, to forbid all maroding and pillaging, and to punish the disobedience of this order with the utmost severity. It
may

may not be improper likewise to accuse the enemy of the most pernicious designs against the inhabitants.

If you are in a Protestant country, as in Saxony for instance, you are to act the part of a zealous protector of Lutherinism; and to inspire the common people, whose simplicity is easily imposed upon, with religious enthusiasm.

If the people are Roman Catholics, you are to talk of nothing but toleration, and throw all the blame of the violent animosity between the different sects of Christians, upon the priests of each; who, notwithstanding their disputes, are agreed in the fundamental articles of faith. With regard to detachments in a neutral country, you are to be very circumspect, unless you are well assured of the good will of the inhabitants, or at least of the greatest part of them.

In

In an enemy's country, as in Bohemia and Moravia, it behoves you to act with infinite caution, and for the reasons mentioned, never to trust a detachment at any considerable distance from your main body. You must carry on all your operations under your own eye. Your light troops are to be chiefly employed in escorting your convoys. You are not to expect ever to be able to gain the affection of the inhabitants. The Hussites in the circle of Konigingratz, are the only people that can be made at all useful. As for the nobility, they are all traitors, notwithstanding they pretend to be well disposed towards us. It is their interest to side with the house of Austria, and therefore it were foolish to depend upon any of them.

I repeat, that all you can do with the people of these countries is judiciously to touch the string of religion; and to convince them how they are oppressed by the priests and the nobility.

Since

Since this article was written, the Empress Queen has considerably augmented the taxes in these provinces, which circumstance may be useful to us. You are to assure the inhabitants that if they should change their master, they would be immediately relieved.



A R T. XV.

Of all the different Marches which an Army can possibly make.

AN Army is put in motion either to invade an enemy's country, to take possession of an advantageous camp, to effect a junction with some reinforcement, to give battle, or to retreat before the enemy.

The first rule is, after having secured your camp, to reconnoitre all the roads and environs, that you may be able to make
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he necessary dispositions according to the different events that may happen.

For this purpose, you will send out large detachments, under various pretences, attended by some engineers and quarter-masters, who are carefully to survey and examine all the roads through which it is possible for troops to march. They are likewise to be attended by a party of Hunters, who are to take particular notice of the roads, that they may be able to conduct the columns what rout soever you may take.

These officers, at their return, are to give in a written report, specifying the situation of your camp, the roads leading to it, the nature of the ground, woods, mountains, rivers and morasses which may happen to be in your neighbourhood. The General being informed of these particulars will proceed to make his disposition, which, if you are not too near the enemy, may be done in the following manner.

I will

I will suppose four different roads
 Pl. I. leading to your camp. The advanced guard will march this evening under the command of N. N. It shall be composed of six battalions of Grenadiers, one of foot, two regiments of Dragoons of five squadrons each, and two regiments of Hussars. The camp equipage of the whole army follows the advanced guard, except their own tents, which they are to take along with them, leaving their heavy baggage with the army.

These troops are to proceed to the distance of about four leagues, and then to occupy the defilés, the river, the height, the town, the village, &c. to which they are directed, and then to wait the arrival of the army, upon which they will take possession of the camp that was before marked out.

Pl. II. Next morning, the army will follow the advanced guard in four columns,

lums, the out posts having first joined their respective corps. The Cavalry of both lines, of the right wing, marching off from the right, will form the first column; the Infantry of both lines, of the right wing, marching off from the right, forms the second column; the Infantry of both lines, of the left wing, filing off from the right, will form the third column; and the Cavalry of the left wing marching also from the right, forms the fourth column.

The regiments of Infantry N. N. of the second line, and the three regiments of Hussars, under the command of General N. N. are to escort the baggage, which is to march in the rear of the two columns of Infantry. He will order four Adjutants to take care that the waggons keep their proper order, and as close as possible.

The General who commands the Rear-guard will observe that he is to give timely notice to the commander in chief, in case he should stand in need of assistance.

The four columns are to be conducted by the Hunters, who have previously made themselves acquainted with the several routs.

At the head of each column will march a detachment of Pioneers, and waggons loaded with beams, girders, and planks, for constructing bridges across small rivers.

The head of each column must have an eye upon the rest as often as they appear, that they may not advance one before the other.

It is required of the Generals, that they make the regiments under their command march close, and follow each other without leaving improper intervals. The officers who command divisions are to preserve their distance with great exactness.

Having passed thro' a defilé, the head of
the

the column must march slow to give time to the rear to come up.

When you have defilés, woods or mountains to pass, you will divide your columns, so that the head of each may consist entirely of Infantry, and all the Cavalry in the rear.

If you have a plain in your center, the Cavalry will form the two center columns, and the Infantry forming the other two, will pass thro' the woods on each flank; but this is to be understood, when the enemy is not near: For in that case, you must be satisfied with marching a few battalions of Grenadiers at the head of each column of Cavalry, that you may not too entirely break your order of battle.

If you are in expectation of any considerable reinforcement, it is prudent to retreat, by some difficult rout and effect your

junction by meeting your friends upon the road. When by this means you are become superior to the enemy, you will soon recover the ground you lent him.

In case you are obliged to march parallel with the enemy, whether from the right or left, you are to preserve your two lines entire, each of them forming a column, preceded by an advanced-guard. In other respects you are to observe the rules above written. Our several marches between Frankenberg and Hohen-Friedberg, were all conducted in this manner. We marched from the right. I prefer this disposition to any other, as the army is instantly formed by facing to the right or left; and I should by no means vary from it, if I had any design to attack the enemy upon the march. I lost the advantage which I might have reaped from it, at Hohen-Friedberg, and at Sohr. In these parallel marches, you must be careful not to expose your flanks.

If the enemy should march with an intention to bring on a battle, your first concern must be to get quit of your heavy baggage, by conveying it, under a strong escort, to the nearest town in your rear. You will then form an advanced-guard, which is to march to the distance of half a league in your front.

In marching in Columns towards the enemy, great care must be taken, not only that they do not advance one before the other, but also, in approaching the field of battle that they preserve their distances with such accuracy, that, when they wheel and form, there may be neither too much nor too little ground for each squadron and battalion. It is a very difficult affair, and therefore seldom accurately executed. Marching in lines has not that inconveniency, and therefore I prefer it whenever it is possible.

A march with an intent to give battle, requires many precautions, and infinite circumspection in the commander in chief. He must, without exposing his person, incessantly reconnoitre the country as he advances, and form in his mind various plans of disposition in case of an attack.

If you happen to be entirely unacquainted with the country, a tolerable idea may be suddenly formed from the tops of hills, or church-steeples, a passage to which may be secured by detachments of light troops from your advanced-guard.

Retreats are commonly made in the following manner. Two or three days before you intend to move, you send off your heavy baggage under a strong escort. You regulate the number of columns according to the roads, and the march of your troops according to the nature of the country. If in an open country, you are to form your advanced-

advanced-guard of Cavalry only; if the contrary, of Infantry. If you have an open plain before you, you will march in four columns.

The Infantry of the second line, Pl. III. of the right wing, filing off from the right, and followed by the second line of Cavalry of the same wing, forms the fourth column. The Infantry of the first line, of the right wing, filing off from the right, and followed by the first line of Cavalry of the same wing, will form the third column. The Infantry of the second line, of the left wing, followed by the Cavalry of the same line, forms the second column. The Infantry of the first line, of the left wing, followed by the Cavalry of the same will form the first column.

Thus your whole Cavalry will form your rear-guard, which, for greater security, must be supported by the Hussars of the army.

If in your retreat you have to pass thro' any defilés, it is necessary that you should dispatch parties of Infantry the evening before your march, to occupy them, with orders to post themselves on each side in such a manner, as to leave a free passage for the troops.

But supposing you chuse to march off in two columns: then the Cavalry on the right files off from the left; the second line moves first, and leads the second column; the Infantry of the second line, succeeded by that of the first, follows this Cavalry. The Cavalry of the left wing will file off from the left: the second line marching first, forms the head of the first column, succeeded by the Infantry of the second line, which is followed by that of the first: This forms the first column.

— Six battalions of the rear of the first line supported by ten squadrons of Hussars, forms

forms the rear guard. These six battalions are to form in order of battle, before the defilé, in two lines, as delineated in Pl. IV.

Whilst the army is passing the Pl. IV. defilé, the infantry which were detached the evening before are to continue formed upon each flank till the whole has passed; after which, the first line of the rear guard, passing thro' the Intervals of the second, will follow the army; the second line will then do the same, covered by the troops posted on each side of the defilé, which are now to form the rear guard.

I know of no manœuvre so difficult as that of passing a river, in your retreat, in the presence of the enemy; nor can I refer you to a better example, upon this subject, than our repassing the Elbe in our retreat in the year 1744. But, as we cannot always find a town upon these occasions, I will suppose only two bridges; in which case it is necessary

fary to throw up a strong intrenchment, which must include both the bridges, with a small kind of ravelin at the head of each.

This being done, you order a sufficient number of troops and cannon to pass with all possible expedition, which are to be planted and posted on the opposite bank. You then cause the intrenchment to be lined with Infantry; and now the army begins to pass both bridges, the Cavalry forming the rear-guard, which is to make its retreat in the alternate manner, as above mentioned.

The army having passed, the troops which lined the intrenchment are to make good their retreat under cover of the fire from the two ravelins: If the enemy should think fit to pursue them, they will likewise be exposed to the cannon and musketry from the opposite side of the river.

The Infantry which lined the intrenchments having passed, you order the bridges
to

to be immediately broken. The troops which defend the ravlins, are to pass in boats under the fire of those on the other side, which are now to advance as near the water as possible till their comrades are disembarked. As soon as the pontoons are upon the carriages the last troops begin their march.



A R T. XVI.

Precautions, in retreating, against Hussars, Pandours, &c.

HUSSARS and Pandours are formidable to those only who are unacquainted with them. They are never courageous, except when inspired by the expectation of booty, or non-resistance, as in the attack of convoys or a flying enemy.

Our troops have nothing to fear from them; but as their skirmishing retards a
march,

march, and as they now and then kill a few men, whom we are sorry to lose in such a manner, I shall prescribe such means as will most effectually counter-act their attempts.

If you are retreating thro' a plain, the Hussars may be dispersed by a few vollies of cannon, and the Pandours by your Hussars and Dragoons, of whom they are terribly afraid. The retreats which are most difficult, and during which the Pandours have it in their power to do most mischief, are when you are obliged to pass thro' woods, defilés, and over mountains. In that case it is almost impossible not to lose some few men. To prevent it, however, as much as you can, your advanced-guard is to take possession of the heights, facing towards the enemy, and your flanking parties are to be very numerous, and exceedingly alert; also each line of Infantry must be intermixt with small parties of Dragoons, ready to act as often as the ground will permit.

permit. Remember, that, upon these occasions, you are not to halt on any account, as it will always expose you to a certain loss.

The Pandours frequently lie flat upon the ground, and discharge their pieces in that situation, and when your detachments quit the heights in pursuit of them, they often get possession of those heights, and by that means become very troublesome. Neither the fire of your musketry, nor your cannon charged with grape shot can do them much mischief, as they are generally concealed behind trees, or laid flat upon their bellies.

In the year 1745 I was obliged to make two retreats of this kind: one thro' the valley of Liebenthal, on my rout to Staudenitz, and the other from Trautenau to Schatzlar. Notwithstanding every imaginable precaution, we lost, in the first, sixty men, killed and wounded, and in the second, not less than two hundred.

When

When you are obliged to retire thro' a difficult country, you must make short marches, that you may be better able to take every necessary precaution. The longest march ought not to exceed two leagues, or one German mile. Thus, not marching in too great a hurry, you may frequently surround some of the Pandours, especially when they are so imprudent as to conceal themselves in small woods.



A R T. XVII.

In what manner our Light Troops are to act against the Hussars and Pandours.

THE most successful method of dislodging the enemy from any of their posts which are defended only by light troops, is to attack it at once briskly without ceremony; for as they are accustomed to a straggling method of fighting, they are unable

able to bear the shock of a regular onset. You must never parley with them. Your sole business is to detach a few troops to cover the flanks of those which are destined for the attack, then charge them with resolution, and they will infallibly give way.

Both our Dragoons and Hussars are to make their attack in close order, sword in hand, and they may depend on success, be the number of the enemy ever so great. X

A R T. XVIII.

By what Means to oblige the Enemy to change his Position, and alter his Measures.

IF we imagine that every motion of ours will oblige the enemy to move also, we are deceived. It is not merely by changing our position, but by the manner in which it is effected that we must expect to force him to decamp. Specious appearances will have

have no effect upon an experienced commander. Your dispositions must be real, and such as will reduce him to the necessity of changing his situation.

For this purpose, it is necessary that you should have a perfect knowledge of the country, the General you have to deal with, the towns in your neighbourhood, the situation of his magazines, and the places whence he draws his forage. These things are to be well weighed and considered, your project maturely formed, and carefully executed.

That General of the two, who has the most resources in his imagination, and who makes the most frequent attempts upon his enemy, will at last pluck the laurel from the rival of his glory.

He who, at the opening of the campaign, is the most expeditious in assembling his troops, and marches before the other to
attack

attack a place, or take possession of an advantageous post, will oblige the enemy to regulate his motions by his, and to act upon the defensive.

Before you endeavour to oblige your enemy to decamp, it is highly necessary you should be certain as to the advantages that will thence follow; whether it may be to draw him off from some town which you intend to surprize, to seduce him into a country where he will find difficulty to subsist, or oblige him to fight to a disadvantage. If you have any of the above reasons, you will then form your plan, but with particular caution, lest in your marches and encampments you distress yourself more than the enemy; as for instance, by exposing, during your absence, an ill fortified town which contains your magazines, and may possibly be surprized by a party of light troops; or by taking such a position as may render you liable to be cut off from your maga-

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zines,

zines, or which you would soon be obliged to abandon for want of subsistence.

These matters being duly weighed and considered, and the probability of any attempt from the enemy calculated, you then form your project, either to encamp upon his flank, to approach the province whence he draws his subsistence, to cut off his communication with the capital, or to threaten his magazines.

To give an example from a case which many of my officers must remember, I will lay down a plan, in consequence of which we might reasonably have expected to oblige prince Charles to abandon Koningratz and Pardubitz, in the year 1745.

In quitting our camp at Dubletz, we ought to have marched to the left, passing along the confines of the county of Glatz, and so on to Hohenmauth. By this manoeuvre we should have obliged the Austrians,

Austrians, whose magazines were at Teutschbrod, and who drew their subsistence principally from Moravia, to march to Landscron, and to abandon Konigingratz, and Pardubitz: And thus also the Saxons, would have been forced to separate from the Austrians in order to cover their own country.

But what then hindered me from pursuing this plan was, that in gaining Konigingratz I should in fact have reaped no advantage, because, in case the Saxons had marched homewards, I must have detached part of my army to sustain the prince of Anhalt; besides the magazine at Glatz would not have supplied me with sufficient subsistence during the campaign.

Sometimes it is possible to oblige the enemy to decamp by detaching a body of troops; and in general every manoeuvre which he does not expect, and against which consequently he is not prepared,

will oblige him to change his position: Such, for instance, is the passage of rivers, or mountains, which are frequently not so impassible as they are thought to be.

Read the campaign of prince Eugene in 1701. The consternation of the French army is sufficiently known, when prince Charles passed the Rhine in the year 1744.

I shall finish these remarks with observing, that these kind of enterprizes must not only be wisely planned, but judiciously executed; and that provided a General acts upon solid principles, tho' he may command an inferior army, he may always oblige his enemy to act upon the defensive, and regulate their motions by his.



A R T. XIX.

Passing of Rivers.

FORCE is entirely useless when the enemy is on the opposite bank of the river which you intend to pass; you must there-

therefore have recourse to stratagem. You need but imitate Cæsar's passing the Rhine, Prince Charles's passage of the same river, or Prince Eugene's passage over the Po, if large rivers be the object.

These Generals detached part of their army to deceive the enemy, and conceal the place where they really intended to pass. They made preparations for constructing bridges in places where they had no design to pass, whilst their army stole a march during the night to some distant part which was not defended by the enemy.

It is common to make choice, for this purpose, of some part of the river where there are small islands, as they greatly contribute to the facility of the operation: it is likewise advisable to pitch upon a spot where you have a wood on the opposite bank, as that will hinder the enemy from attacking you immediately upon your landing.

These attempts require infinite precaution. You must take particular care that your boats, pontoons, &c. are conveyed to the place of rendezvous precisely at the hour appointed, and that each person employed be properly instructed, to avoid the confusion which generally attends nocturnal expeditions. All things being properly disposed, you order the troops to pass, and establish themselves on the other side.

In every attempt of this sort, it is necessary that both extremities of your bridge should be covered by an intrenchment properly lined with troops. The islands must likewise be fortified in order to defend your bridge from any attempt of the enemy.

If the river is not too broad, you will chuse a place where it makes an elbow, and where the bank rises so as to command the opposite side. You plant as many cannon as the ground will permit.

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A R T. XX.

In what Manner to prevent the passing of Rivers.

NOTHING is more difficult, not to say impossible, than to prevent the enemy from passing a river; especially if the front of attack be too extensive. It is indeed so extremely difficult, that if the part to be defended should extend above five or six leagues, I would not attempt it, unless I had several redoubts already thrown up on the banks of the rivers; moreover there must be no part of it fordable.

But supposing things to be thus circumstanced, it will nevertheless require time to make the necessary preparations, which are to be effected in the following manner.

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First

First you will cause all the vessels, which are to be found upon the river, to be collected and brought to the redoubts, to prevent them from being of any use to the enemy.

You will reconnoitre the banks of the river, and demolish those parts which seem to offer a passage to the enemy.

You will observe particularly every eminence which may serve to cover the enemy in their passage, and determine your method of attack upon each.

You will cause several spacious avenues to be opened leading to the banks of the river, so that upon the appearance of the enemy, you may march in different columns to oppose them.

Having taken these precautions, you will encamp your army near the center of your
line

line of defence, so that you may be nearly at the same distance from each extremity.

You will distribute sixteen small detachments along the banks of the river, commanded by the same number of the most active and vigilant officers of Dragoons or Hussars, eight of which are to be subject to the orders of a General upon the right, and the other eight to those of another General upon the left. These detachments are to watch the motions of the enemy, and to give immediate notice of any attempt to pass. In the day time their sentries will be sufficient to observe the enemy, but during the night they must send patrols every quarter of an hour along the river, with orders not to return till they distinctly conceived the enemy's design.

The two Generals who command these detachments, as also the officers who command the redoubts, are to repair to the commander in chief four times a day. It
is

is also necessary, for greater dispatch, to have a proper number of horses stationed upon the roads for the use of the expresses. As upon the appearance of the enemy, the presence of the General will be required, every preparation for his departure should be previously made.

These several dispositions being fixt, he will distribute to each of his Generals, the orders relative to the attack. He will march with all the expedition possible, the Infantry at the head of each column, because he must suppose the enemy would throw up an intrenchment the moment they had passed the river. He will attack them on the instant of his arrival without the least hesitation; for his success will depend upon his resolution.

Small rivers are still more difficult to defend. All that can be done in this case is to render the fords impassible by trees thrown into the water; but in case the opposite

posite bank by its height commands the other, all attempts to oppose their passing will be useless.



A R T. XXI.

Of taking Towns by Surprise.

TOWNS are not to be surprized unless their fortifications are bad or their garrison weak; and in case they are environed by a wet ditch, it can only be attempted in the winter, when the water is froze over.

A Town may be surprized by a whole army, as was the case at Prague in the year 1741; or after lulling the garrison into a state of security by a tedious blockade, as was done by Prince Leopold of Anhalt, at Glogau; or by detachment, as was attempted by Prince Eugene at Cremona, and as was executed at Cosel by the Austrians.

The

The principal thing required in making your dispositions for a Surprise, is a perfect knowledge of the fortification, especially the interior parts of it; otherwise your attack will be improperly directed.

The Surprise of Glogau was a masterpiece of the military art, worthy the imitation of all those who would attempt anything of the like nature. That of Prague was by no means so extraordinary, as from its vast extent it was much more difficult to defend. Cosel and Cremona were betrayed; the first, by an officer of the garrison, who having deserted, informed the enemy, that the fossè was not entirely finished: Every one knows the story of the latter.

If you attempt small places, you have nothing to do but to apply petards to one of the gates, posting troops at the others, to prevent the escape of the garrison. In case
you

you find it necessary to employ cannon, take care to plant them in such a manner that your artillery men, are not exposed to the fire of the enemy's musketry, or you will be in danger of losing your cannon.



A R T. XXII.

Surprise, Attack, Defence, Battles, &c.

IT is very difficult to surprize the Austrians in their camp, on account of the number of light troops with which they are surrounded.

If two armies are encamped near each other, a battle must soon be the consequence, unless that which acts defensively happens to be so advantageously situated as not to be attacked. Surprizes are less frequent in large armies, than with detachments.

The

The most flattering circumstances in favour of an attempt to surprize the enemy in his camp, are his imaginary security and dependence on the superior number of his troops, the strength of his situation, the reports of his spies, or the vigilance of his Hussars.

But before you form any design of this sort, you must be perfectly acquainted with the country and the position of the enemy. You will particularly examine the roads, and regulate your disposition after having maturely considered and compared every minute circumstance.

You will select, from among your Hunters, those which are the most intelligent and best acquainted with the country, to conduct the columns.

Above all things conceal your design: secrecy is the very soul of such enterprizes:

Your

Your light troops are to precede your march under various pretences; but in reality to prevent your design being discovered by some rascal of a deserter. They will also prevent the enemy's light troops from discovering the march of your army.

You will be very particular, and explicit, in your orders to the Generals employed upon this service; that each of them be well informed concerning the part which he is expected to act.

If the enemy be encamped upon a plain, your advanced-guard must consist of Dragoons, which in conjunction with the Hussars, must be ordered to enter their camp pell-mell, in order to throw them into confusion, and put all to the sword who offer to oppose them. These Dragoons must be supported by your whole army. The Infantry in the front are to charge the Cavalry on the wings of the enemy.

The

The advanced-guards are to begin their attack half an hour before day-break, at which time the army must not be above eight hundred paces in their rear.

You must be careful to preserve a profound silence during the march, and give very strict orders against smoking tobacco.

The attack being begun, and the day beginning to dawn, your Infantry, in four or six columns, are to march boldly to the camp of the enemy, to support the advanced guard.

They are not to begin to fire till daylight, lest you destroy your own people; but as soon as the day appears, they must direct their fire to those parts where the advanced-guard have not pierced, particularly towards the Cavalry on the wings, which will oblige the men to leave their horses, not having time to boot and saddle.

You

You will continue the pursuit with your whole army till you have passed the enemy's camp, and then detach your cavalry to harass them in their retreat.

If the enemy have left their arms behind them, you must continue the pursuit with all imaginable expedition, leaving a strong detachment to guard their camp; for thus you will have a fair opportunity totally to ruin their army, and be at full liberty to act without controul during the remainder of the campaign.

Fortune presented me with such an opportunity before the battle of Mollwitz. We approached Marshal Neuperg's army without being discovered by any one man living. His troops were then cantoned in three villages; but at that time I had not sufficient experience to know how to avail myself of such an opportunity. I ought immediately to have ordered two of

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my columns to surround the village of Mollwitz, and then to have attacked it. I ought at the same instant to have detached my Dragoons, with orders to have attacked the other two villages which contained the Austrian Cavalry. The Infantry which should have followed, would have prevented them from mounting. If I had proceeded in this manner, I am convinced I should have totally destroyed the Austrian army.

I have already shewn how you are to secure your camp from being surprized by the enemy; but if, notwithstanding all your precautions to keep them at a distance, they should approach your camp, your first business is to form the army with all imaginable expedition on the ground previously marked out for that purpose, and to order the Cavalry to remain firm in their position till day light. The Generals will then examine the situation of affairs, and you will direct your motions accordingly.

ingly. But in such cases, it is necessary that each General should know in what manner to act, without waiting for orders from the commander in chief.

For my own part, I would never chuse to act during the night, as those night works are generally attended with confusion, and because soldiers seldom do their duty, but when they are observed by their officers, and are apprehensive of punishment.

Charles XII. in the year 1715, attacked the prince of Anhalt in the night, the moment he had landed on the island of Rugen. The king of Sweden was in the right, because he chose to conceal the small number of his troops. He had no more than four thousand men, with which he attacked twenty thousand: he was defeated.

An axiom in the art of war, is to secure your rear and flanks, and to endeavour to

turn those of the enemy; this may be done by various methods, all proceeding from the same principle.

When you are obliged to attack an entrenched enemy, it is always best to do it immediately, and before his works are quite finished. What may be practicable to day, to morrow may be impossible. But before you proceed to attack, it is absolutely necessary that you should, in person, reconnoitre the position of the enemy, that you may be able to judge of the facility or difficulty of your enterprize.

The reason why intrenchments are generally forced, is because their flanks are not sufficiently secured. Those of Turenne, as also those of Schellenberg, were carried, because the prince of Anhalt found means to get upon their flanks. The trenches at Malplaquet were enfiladed from the wood upon the left of Marshal Villars. If the allies had perceived this, at the beginning
of

of the battle, they might have saved at least fifteen thousand men.

If intrenchments be flanked by a river which is fordable, they may be easily attacked on that side. Those at Stralsund, made by the Swedes, were forced because they were attacked on that side towards the sea, where it is fordable.

If the enemy's intrenchments are so extensive as to be but thinly lined with troops, you will in that case make several attacks at the same time, and by that means you will certainly succeed, provided you take sufficient care to conceal your disposition.

Plate VI. shews the following plan of attack. I form a line of twenty battalions, my left wing extending to the river N. N. Twelve battalions form the attack upon the left, where I intend to penetrate, and the other eight, that of the right. The second line of the troops destined for the attack

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must

must cover the intervals of the first, which are to be equal to the front of a battalion. The rest of the Infantry will form a third line, with the Cavalry in their rear at the distance of four hundred paces. By this disposition, your reserve of Infantry will be a check upon the enemy, and will be ready to take advantage of any false step which he may happen to make.

Each attack must be followed by a number of Pioneers, &c. with tools and fascines to fill up the ditch for the Cavalry to pass.

The Infantry which make the attack are not to fire till they have forced the intrenchment, and are formed upon the parapet.

The Cavalry having passed the trench, will form as soon as possible, that they may be ready to charge. If they should be repulsed, they will rally under the fire of the Infantry, till by repeated attacks the enemy are entirely routed.

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I repeat here, what I have said in a former chapter, that I am no advocate for intrenched camps; unless it were to cover a siege, and even in that case I know not whether it be not always more advisable to meet the enemy in the field.

But if for any very particular reason, you are determined to intrench your army, the most advantageous methods of defence are the following.

First, you will order two or three strong corps of reserve, and post them in such a manner that they may be ready to support those parts where the attack appears most violent.

Pl. VI. You will likewise post small bodies of reserve in the rear of each battalion which lines the trench, ready to sustain it in case of need.

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Your Cavalry will be drawn up in one line in the rear of these reserves.

The extremities of your intrenchment must be well secured: if by a river, they must be carried so far into the water as effectually to prevent your being taken in flank; if you have a wood upon your flanks, you must throw up a redoubt, and fell a considerable number of trees. Be careful also that your redans are well flanked.

Your fosse must be both deep and wide, and you will daily add to your strength, either by giving more width to your trench, raising your parapet, securing the entrance of your barriers with pallisades, sinking pits in your front, or in surrounding your camp with chevaux de frize.

Your greatest security will arise from a skilful observance of certain maxims in fortification,

tification, by which you make the front of attack as little extensive as possible, and oblige the enemy to make his assault in those parts which are best flanked and defended.

Pl. VII. The plate here referred to will give you a perfect idea of my meaning. The army of the enemy is confined on one side by a river, and is out-flanked by the army which he is about to attack. He dares not attempt your right, because the battery on that wing would gall him in flank, whilst the redoubt in the center bears upon his rear: so that he is obliged to attack the redoubt in the center; and as you may be certain of this, you naturally turn your whole attention to that part of your fortification.

Pl. VIII. shews you another kind of intrenchment, consisting of falliant and re-entering redoubts, crossing each other, and joined by a trench. Thus the falliant redoubts

doubts form the points of attack, and as they are few in number, they may be constructed in less time than if the whole front were fortified in any other manner.

It is necessary that the fire of your musketry from the salient redoubts should cross, and therefore they must not be above six hundred paces from each other.

It is our custom to defend our intrenchments by discharges of whole battalions at a time.—Each soldier must be provided with a hundred cartridges; but this does not hinder your mounting between the battalions, and in the salient angles of the redoubts, as many cannon as you possibly can.

Whilst the enemy is at a distance, your cannon will fire ball; but as soon as they are advanced within four hundred paces, you are to load with grape shot.

If

If the enemy, notwithstanding the strength of your works and an obstinate resistance, should penetrate into your camp, your reserve of Infantry must be ordered to march and attack them before they have time to form; and in case your reserve should be obliged to give way, it is then the business of the Cavalry to make the last effort to repulse them.

An attack upon intrenchments generally succeeds, either because they are ill constructed, or that the troops which defend them are seized with a panic, owing chiefly to their ignorance of the enemy's real intentions, who, being more at liberty, commonly acts with more resolution.

I have found, by experience, that an intrenchment being forced dispirits a whole army. I was of opinion that my soldiers would have shewn more resolution; but what signifies resolution if intrenchments are in themselves disadvantageous?

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If intrenchments are naturally disadvantageous, lines are still more so. We copied this fashion from prince Lewis of Baden, who first constructed lines at the Briel. The French also used them in a former war. I am firmly of opinion that they are bad, because they are too extensive to be properly defended, and by means of different attacks may easily be forced: they are therefore of no use in covering a country, and serve only to sacrifice the reputation of the troops which defend them.

If we are inferior to the enemy in point of number, we must not therefore despair of success: this deficiency may frequently be supplied by the abilities of the commander.

An inferior army will always chuse an inclosed or mountainous country, where if its flanks are well secured, superior numbers will be no advantage to the enemy: now
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it is self evident that it is always much easier to secure your flanks in a mountainous or inclosed country, than on a plain. We should not have gained the battle of Sorh if the ground had not been favourable to us; for tho' the Austrians were double our number, as it was impossible for them to out-flank us, we engaged upon an equality.

My first rule regards the choice of ground, and the second, the disposition of my troops: My oblique order of battle will in many cases be found more successful than the other. The method is, to order one wing to retreat, while you reinforce that which is intended to attack, by which means you carry your whole strength to that wing which is to flank the enemy. In the Plate referred to in the margin, you will see that

Pl. IX. I make the principal effort with my right wing. I throw a body of Infantry imperceptibly into the wood, to flank the Cavalry of the enemy, and to cover the attack of my own. In the mean time

a few regiments of hussars have orders to fall upon their rear whilst the army advances. When the enemy's Cavalry is defeated, my Infantry in the wood will flank that of the enemy, whilst we attack them in front. My left wing is not to advance till the left wing of the enemy is entirely defeated.

The advantages from this disposition are these; first, it enables you to make head against a superior army with a small body of troops; secondly, to gain a decisive battle by engaging only a small part of your army; and thirdly, in case of a defeat, as but one wing has suffered, you have at least two thirds of your army to enable you to make a regular retreat.

In case you are determined to make an attack upon an advantageous post, it is necessary that you should first be perfectly acquainted with the nature and degree of its strength, and you will then naturally assault
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that part where you have reason to expect the least resistance.

The attack of villages is generally attended with so much loss that I am determined nothing but absolute necessity shall oblige me to it; for in these attacks you will often sacrifice the flower of your Infantry.

Some Generals are of opinion, that it is always best to attack the enemy in the center. This I will illustrate by an example. I suppose the enemy in possession of two large towns, and two villages upon their wings. Now it is certain that the wings are lost the moment you have penetrated the center, and that by this means you have a chance to gain a compleat victory.

In the attack of a post, there is nothing more destructive than batteries firing grape shot. At Sohr and at Kesseldorf I saw some batteries attacked, and reflecting on
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that subject, have conceived an idea which I will here communicate, on the supposition that you have to attack a battery of fifteen pieces of cannon which it is impossible to approach upon either flank.

I have observed that the fire of the cannon, together with that of the Infantry which supports the battery, renders it absolutely inaccessible. We took the batteries of the enemy, because they were injudiciously defended. Our Infantry being repulsed, that of the enemy foolishly quitted their trenches to pursue us, after which they did not dare to fire their cannon for fear of killing their own people. We then drove them back in our turn, and entered their batteries along with them.

Hence I conceived the idea that the best method of attacking a battery is to form your Infantry into two lines with intervals between each battalion, the intervals of the first line being covered by the regiments of
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the second, and a reserve of a few squadrons of dragoons in the rear of the whole. The first line must be ordered to make a feeble attack, and then retire thro' the intervals of the second, which stratagem may possibly reduce the enemy to abandon their post in pursuit of the fugitives: in which case you will immediately advance with your whole force. Pl. XI. will illustrate this manoeuvre.

I have made it a general rule, never to place my whole dependance upon one single post, unless I have a moral certainty of its being unattackable. X

The chief excellence of my troops consists in attacking; it is therefore highly imprudent in us to relinquish this advantage without sufficient reason. But when we are obliged to occupy posts, let us be careful to fix them upon high ground and to secure our flanks effectually.

It may frequently be advisable to set fire

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to

the villages in your front and upon your flanks, provided the wind blows so as to carry the smoke towards the enemy. If there are any stone buildings in your front, it may not be improper to lodge troops in them, which may gall the enemy during the action.

Be particularly cautious never to confine your army in a spot of ground which will not afford sufficient room for it to act. On this account our situation at Grotkau was an extreme bad one, our center and our left wing having a morass in front, so that no more than a part of our right wing could manoeuvre.

Villeroi was defeated at Ramillies because he was situated in this manner. His left wing became entirely useless: therefore the enemy turn'd their whole force upon his right, and they succeeded.

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I have no objection that my troops should take the advantage of strong posts to cover certain movements, and for the sake of their artillery; but I would not have them wait for the enemy. I would have them quit their posts and march boldly to meet their antagonist, who finding his schemes thus frustrated, will probably be disconcerted; for unexpected movements are generally attended with happy effects. Battles gained in this manner are generally decisive. Your Infantry are to have positive orders not to fire; for the advantage you expect does not arise from the number of slain, but from the ground you have gained. The most certain way to be victorious is to march intrepidly towards the enemy and endeavour to gain ground.

It is a general custom to leave an interval of fifteen paces between each Squadron in a mountainous or inclosed country; but

if upon a plain, to form your cavalry in one continued line.

You allow no other intervals between each regiment of Infantry than what is necessary for the cannon.

In the attack of batteries, intrenchments, villages, as also in the rear-guard of a retreat, you are to leave large intervals between each squadron and battalion, that those of the first line may have sufficient room to retire thro' the second. Let this be an invariable maxim.

It may not be improper in this place to give you a few principal rules to be observed in forming an army for battle on whatsoever ground it may happen. First you are to fix a certain point of view for
Pl. XI. each wing; for instance, in a line with the steeple N. N. It is the business of every General to be extremely careful that his army does not take a false position. It

It is not always necessary to wait till the whole army is formed in order to begin the attack. A favourable opportunity may frequently offer, which the delay of one quarter of an hour might destroy. Nevertheless it is requisite that the greatest part of your army should be drawn up, and you will be particularly attentive to your first line, and according to its position regulate your order of battle. If the regiments belonging to that line are not all come up, their places are to be filled by those of the second. Remember, what I have already mentioned more than once, that your flanks are by no means to be left exposed, especially that which is to make the chief effort.

Your order of battle, if on an open plain, should be equally strong in all its parts; for the enemy, being at liberty to act as he shall think fit, may reserve a powerful body of troops ready to penetrate where you seem least capable of resistance.

In case one of your wings happens to be exposed, the General who commands the second line must detach part of his Dragoons to cover the flank of the first line, without waiting for orders; and a party of Hussars from the third line should be ordered to cover the out-flank of the Dragoons. The reason of this is, that if the enemy should endeavour to flank the Cavalry of the first line, these Dragoons and Hussars may be ready to do the same by theirs.

Pl. XII. In the plate here referred to, you will see that I have placed three battalions between the two lines on the left wing of my Infantry; it is done for the better security of that wing: for if your Cavalry should be repulsed, these battalions would prevent the Infantry from suffering, as was the case at Molwitz.

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The General who commands the second line, must take care to preserve a distance of three hundred paces between the two lines, and the moment he perceives any intervals in the first, he must cause them to be filled up by as many battalions from the second.

If upon a plain, you must invariably have a reserve of Cavalry in the rear of the center of your Infantry, which reserve must be commanded by an officer of abilities, because he must act without waiting for orders, supporting whichever wing may stand in need of assistance, by charging the enemy in flank, and by that means enabling your Cavalry to rally in case they should have been forced to give way.

The Cavalry are always to attack in full gallop. The Infantry are to march briskly towards the enemy, and the commanders of regiments are to take special care that

they do not fire till the enemy have turned their backs.

If in advancing the men should begin to throw away their fire without orders, let them be commanded to shoulder their arms, and in that position to advance towards the enemy.

As soon as the enemy begins to give way, the Colonels are to cause their respective regiments to give a general discharge. A battle conducted in this manner, will be very soon decided.

In Pl. XIII. you will find a new order of battle, different from the rest, having Infantry posted on the extremity of each wing. These battalions are intended to sustain the Cavalry, and with their cannon to gall that of the enemy as they advance; besides they will prevent your wing from being pursued, in case it should be repulsed;

as the enemy will not dare to put themselves between two fires.

When your Cavalry are to all appearance become victorious, the Infantry upon the extremity of that wing, will advance and fire upon the Cavalry of the enemy. The battalions in the intervals are now to wheel a part of the circle, and fire upon their Infantry in flank and rear.

The victorious wing of Cavalry is not to give that of the enemy time to rally, but to pursue their advantage in good order, and to endeavour to cut them off from their Infantry. As soon as the confusion shall become general, the commander of your Cavalry will dispatch his Hussars, supported by his Dragoons, to fall upon their rear. He will likewise send a detachment of Dragoons to cut off the retreat of the Infantry, collect the stragglers, and make as many prisoners as possible.

In

In this order of battle, I have mixt several squadrons of Dragoons with the Infantry of the second line: The reason of this is, because that in all our engagements with the Austrians I have remarked that, after the firing had continued about a quarter of an hour their battalions began to swarm round their colours. At the battle of Hohen-Friedberg, our Cavalry broke in upon several of these vortices and made many of them prisoners. Now by this disposition your Dragoons being near at hand, by ordering them to charge the Infantry before they have time to recover from their confusion, they will certainly make considerable havock.

It may be objected, that I have ordered my Infantry not to fire, and that in all my dispositions my artillery seems to be the chief object of my dependance. To which I answer, that of the two things which I suppose, one of them must certainly happen:
either

either my Infantry will fire notwithstanding my orders, or by observing them, they will force the enemy to give ground. In either of these cases, the Cavalry are to charge the moment the enemy appears to be in confusion, who being attacked upon their flank whilst they are charged in front, and perceiving their second line of Cavalry partly cut off, the greatest part of them must inevitably fall into your hands. It will not then be a battle, but a total destruction of the enemy, if they happen not to be favoured in their retreat by a *defilé* close in their rear.

Your heavy cannon are to be placed upon the heights, and your field pieces at the distance of fifty paces in the front of your line. The Gunners are to be careful not to throw away their ball, but be sure of their object before they fire. Your field pieces are to continue firing as you advance, and as soon as you come within five hundred paces of the enemy, they are to move
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in a line with the regiments to which they belong. If the enemy should retreat, the heavy cannon is then to move up with all expedition and fire upon their rear.

To each cannon in the front line, there must be six gunners and three pioneers. I forgot to observe, that when you come within three hundred and fifty paces of the enemy, you are to begin to fire grape shot.

But what signifies the art of conquest, if we know not how to reap the advantages of victory? To spill the blood of our troops to no purpose is extremely inhuman. Not to pursue a defeated enemy, is to render our good fortune useless, and our success of little consequence: Nevertheless there may be reasons, such as want of subsistence, or over-fatigue, which may make it impossible to act as we otherwise would.

But a want of subsistence upon these occasions is always a fault in the commander
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in chief. If he proceeds upon a regular plan, he must necessarily have foreseen the battle some time before it happened; he ought therefore to have provided his troops with eight or ten days bread or biscuit; and as to the article of fatigue, unless his people have been harrassed in a particular manner, he must consider, that extraordinary efforts must be made where extraordinary advantages may be expected.

After a victory, the first thing to be done is to send off a detachment, from the regiments which have suffered most, to conduct the wounded to an hospital previously established.

You are to continue the pursuit with the whole army, till you are interrupted by a défilé, where the enemy will probably make a stand; but their resistance will be very feeble if you do not give them time to recollect themselves.

The pursuit being ended, you are next to mark out your camp, which must be done regularly and with circumspection; for it is dangerous to be too secure even after a victory.

In case the victory was compleat, you may send off detachments, either to cut off their retreat, seize their magazines, or lay siege to two or three towns at the same time.

Upon this subject it is impossible for me to do more than lay down general rules. Different events will require different management. Be it remembered however, that you are never to suppose you have done enough, so long as it is in your power to do more; nor that a vanquished enemy will not take advantage of your misconduct.

The general rules to be observed in a battle hold equally good in every detached engagement.

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If the commanders of detachments are able to contrive in such a manner as to be reinforced during the conflict, they may be assured of success; for such a reinforcement will appear greatly magnified in the eyes of the enemy, and will effectually damp their resolution.

When your Infantry have only Hussars to engage with, it may not be improper to form them in two ranks, as by that means you will extend your front, and the men will be able to load and fire with greater ease; but in general even this is doing them too much honour.

The worst consequence of a defeat is not the loss of those that are slain, but the discouragement of the survivors; for four or five thousand men, more or less in an army of fifty thousand, makes in reality no essential difference.

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A General who has been defeated, ought to endeavour, as soon as possible, to obliterate the remembrance of his misfortune, and by his cheerful countenance to reanimate both officers and soldiers. He should neither exaggerate nor extenuate his loss.

I pray Heaven, that the Prussians may never be defeated, and I dare believe, that so long as they are well disciplined and properly commanded, that will never happen; but in case it should ever be their lot, you will observe the following rules in order to retrieve your misfortune. As soon as you perceive that you have lost the battle beyond all resource, and that any farther resistance would be in vain, you will take the second line of Infantry and cause it to occupy the nearest defilé in your rear, disposed in the manner I have laid down in the article on Retreats: To this place you will also cause to be transported as many of your cannon as you possibly can.

If

If there should happen to be no défilé near at hand, your first line must retreat thro' the intervals of the second, and form again at the distance of about three hundred paces in the rear of it.

You will then collect all the Cavalry that remains, and if you find it practicable, you may form a hollow square.

We find two celebrated hollow squares mentioned in history: one conducted by General Schulembourg, after the battle of Frauenstadt, by means of which he retired beyond the Oder, without Charles XII. being able to disconcert his measures; and that of the Prince of Anhalt, after General Stirum had lost the first battle of Hochstædt: that Prince traversed a plain of two leagues without the French Cavalry daring to attack him.

I shall conclude this article with observing, that tho' you have been defeated, you

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are not therefore to make a continued retreat of forty miles, but you are to halt at the first advantageous post, and there to make a resolute stand, as the only means to recover the drooping spirits of your army.



A R T. XXIII.

Why, and in what manner, to give battle:

A Battle often decides the fate of Kingdoms; and in the course of a war it may be necessary to bring on a decisive action, either to extricate yourself out of some difficulty, or to put an end to a quarrel which might otherwise terminate in the ruin of both parties.

A wise General will not give battle without having some important end in view; and if ever he is forced to it by the enemy, it is certainly in consequence of some fault which he has committed, and which has rendered

rendered him no longer master of his own actions.

In this observation, it is obvious that I have not spared myself. In five capital battles which I have fought, three of them only were premeditated. At Mollwitz I was obliged to fight, because the Austrians had got between me and Wohlau, which contained my artillery and my subsistence: At Sohr, they had cut off my communication with Trautenau, so that it was impossible for me to avoid a battle, without risking the entire ruin of my army. But the difference between such forced battles and those which are premeditated, is very apparent. How different were the consequences of that of Hohen-Friedberg, of Kesseldorf, and Czaflau; the last of which procured us a peace.

Whilst I am giving rules for fighting battles, I am not unmindful that I myself have often failed thro' inadvertence; but I

would have my officers to profit from my mistakes, and to know that I have endeavoured to correct my errors.

It sometimes happens that both armies wish to engage; in that case every obstacle is speedily removed.

The most advantageous battles, are those which you oblige the enemy to fight against his inclination; for it is a known maxim in the art of war, that you are constantly to endeavour to force the enemy to act contrary to his inclination, because, your interest being diametrically opposite to his, you are naturally to seek that which he wishes to avoid.

The principal reasons for giving battle are, either to oblige the enemy to raise the siege of a town, to drive him from the possession of a country, to penetrate into some province, to invest a fortress, or to oblige him to lessen the terms of accommodation in case he should be obstinate.

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The means of forcing the enemy to fight are, either by forced marches to get into his rear, to cut off his communications, or to threaten some town of importance. But in making these attempts, you are to be very careful, lest you expose yourself to those very inconveniences with which you endeavour to distress your enemy, lest you put it in his power to cut you off from your own magazines.

When you have formed a design to attack your enemy's rear-guard, you must encamp as near to him as possible, and as soon as he retires and attempts to pass a défilé in your presence, you fall upon his rear with impetuosity. Such attacks are never attended with much loss, and are frequently very advantageous.

It is often the practice of Generals to harass their armies to prevent the junction of two corps, when it is in the power of

the enemy, by a single forced march, to frustrate all their labour. Nothing can be more unpardonable than to harrafs your people to no purpose.

In the course of a campaign it will sometimes happen, that the faults of your enemy may invite you to engage contrary to your intention; but you are to take care, that they are not voluntary slips designed to lead you into a snare.

To these reflections I will add, that it is our interest to carry on our wars with great spirit and alacrity, to prevent their continuing too long; because a tedious war must relax our excellent discipline, depopulate our country, and exhaust our finances: therefore it is the duty of every Prussian General to endeavour to the utmost of his abilities to bring matters to a speedy issue. He must not follow the example of Marshal Luxembourg, who when his son was for taking another town, answered him in
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these words: What, would you have us return home and plant cabbages? Let them rather recollect the words of Sannerib the Hebrew; It is better that one man perish than a whole people.

In the account of the battle of Senef, you will find a striking instance of taking the advantage of an enemy's misconduct, where the Prince of Condé fell upon the Prince of Orange's rear, in consequence of the Prince of Waldeck's having neglected to occupy a defilé, which would have secured his rear in their retreat. The battle of Raucouz affords another example of this kind.



A R T. XXIV.

Of Accidents, and unexpected Events in War:

THIS would be a very long article, if I were to treat of all the accidents that may possibly happen to thwart a General

of an army. Great abilities, with a little good fortune, will sometimes remove all difficulties.

The commander of an army is, in one respect, very disagreeably situated. He is very often condemned without being heard. Every gazette takes the liberty to expose his actions to the judgment of the meanest vulgar; and among the thousands who condemn him, there is hardly one man capable of conducting the smallest detachment.

I do not mean to justify those Generals who have made flagrant mistakes; I will not vindicate my own campaign in 1744: yet among many faults, the siege of Prague, my retreat and defence of Kolin, and also my retreat into Silesia were tolerably conducted: But there are many unfortunate events, which no human skill or foresight can possibly prevent.

Writing

Writing only for my own Generals, I shall quote no other instances than those which have happened to myself. Whilst we were at Reichenbach, I formed a design to pass the river Neifs by a forced march, and to post myself between the town of that name and Neuperg's army, in order to cut off his communication. The necessary dispositions were accordingly made; but there fell in the mean time such heavy rain, that my advanced guard with the pontoons could not possibly get along. Whilst we were on our march, the fog became so extremely thick, that it was impossible for our out-guards to find their way to their regiments. So that instead of four in the morning, as was designed, we did not arrive till noon, and thus my project was entirely frustrated.

If sickness should invade your camp during your operations, you will soon be reduced to act defensively, as was my case in

Bohemia, in 1741, owing to the bad provisions with which the army had been supplied.

At the battle of Hohen-Friedberg I sent one of my Aid de Camps with orders to the Margrave Charles, who was the oldest General, to put himself at the head of the second line, General Kalckstein having been detached to the right wing against the Saxons. This Aid de Camp mistaking my orders, told the Margrave to form a second line of the first. Happily I perceived the blunder time enough to prevent its consequences.

Hence it is of the utmost importance for the commander of an army, not only to give proper directions, but also to have an eye to their execution. If a General commanding a detachment should be taken ill or be killed, your project may be entirely disconcerted. An army acting offensively requires brave and able Generals. The number of these is very small. I have many brave officers; but few Generals of great abilities.

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If, notwithstanding all your precautions, the enemy should carry off two or three of your convoys, your measures are disconcerted, and your schemes ruined, or at least suspended.

If you should find it necessary to make any retrograde movements, it will greatly dispirit your troops. At the battle of Mollwitz, I found how difficult it is to reanimate a corps which happens to have been much discouraged. My Cavalry were at that time so extremely diffident, that they believed themselves led on to certain destruction. I employed them in small detachments, in order to enure them by degrees. It is only since the battle of Hohen-Friedberg, that they are become what they ought to be, and what they now are.

If the enemy should discover one of your principal spies, whom you have sent to his camp, you are disappointed of the intelligence

gence you expected, and consequently must remain inactive, as you are uncertain of his situation.

The negligence of officers, who are sent out to reconnoitre, may prove another cause of great embarrassment, as was the case of Marshal Neuperg: the officer of Hussars, who was detached upon that service, having neglected his duty, we fell upon them entirely unawares. It was owing to the carelessness of an officer of the regiment of Ziethen, that the enemy were suffered to construct their bridge at Selmitz, and carry off part of our baggage.

Hence it appears highly imprudent, to trust the safety of a whole army to the vigilance of a single officer. Things of such importance ought never to depend entirely upon one man, especially a subaltern officer, whose age and inexperience renders him less equal to the charge. You will remember

member what I have said upon this subject, in the article on the defence of rivers.

Patroles, and reconnoitring parties, should be considered as superfluous precautions; you are by no means to depend upon them, but to take every other method of security.

Treason in an army, is certainly the greatest misfortune that can befall it. Prince Eugene, in the year 1733, was betrayed by General St—, who suffered himself to be corrupted by the French. I myself lost Cosel by the treachery of an officer of the garrison, who deserted to the enemy, and conducted them to the place.

From these considerations it follows, that we ought not to presume too much upon our good fortune, even in the midst of success, since all our foresight and knowledge may be rendered ineffectual by chance and accident, which, by I know not what destiny, so frequently interferes, possibly with a design to correct the presumption of mankind.

A R T.



A R T. XXV.

Whether it be absolutely necessary for the General of an Army to call Councils of War.

PRINCE Eugene used to say, that a General who had no mind to fight, need only call a council of war; and it is very certain, that in these meetings the question is generally carried in the negative: even secrecy, which is the very soul of war, is but seldom strictly observed.

A General, whom his sovereign has entrusted with the command of an army, ought to act in consequence of his own opinion, in which he is sufficiently authorized by the confidence which is reposed in him. Nevertheless I am of opinion, that he ought not entirely to reject the advice even of a subaltern, provided, after mature deliberation,

beration, it seems reasonable. In that case, he ought to forget the rank of him who started the hint, and act as if it had been his own.



A R T. XXVI.

Manoeuvres of an Army.

IT will appear from the maxims which I have laid down in this work, upon what system are built the evolutions which I have introduced in my army. The principal object of these manoeuvres, is to gain time on every occasion, and to bring every engagement to a more speedy decision than was formerly the case; but particularly to bear down the enemy by the impetuosity of our Cavalry: for thus even the coward, swept along by the violence of the brave, is compelled to do his duty, and every individual becomes useful.

I flatter

I flatter myself, therefore, that all my Generals, being convinced of the necessity and advantage of discipline, will do their utmost to preserve it, by keeping our troops in constant exercise, as well in time of war as in time of peace.

I shall never forget the words of Vegetius, who with a true military enthusiasm says: *And at length, the discipline of the Romans triumphed over the strength, cunning, and numbers of barbarous nations, and subdued all the known world.* The entire prosperity of every state rests upon the discipline of its army.



A R T. XXVII.

Of Winter Quarters.

THE Campaign being finished, we are to think of Winter Quarters, the arrangement of which are to depend upon various circumstances.

Our

Our first business is to form the chain of troops which is to cover our quarters. This is done, either behind a river, under cover of a range of strong posts, or under protection of fortified towns.

In the winter of 1741 and 1742, that body of my troops which quartered in Bohemia, had the Elbe in front. The chain which covered them began at Brandeis, and passing by Nienbourg, Kohn, Podjebrod and Pardubitz, terminated at Konigingratz.

But it must be remembered that rivers may be froze over, and therefore are not to be depended on. You will have the precaution to intersperse along the chain a number of Hussars, who are to be constantly attentive to the motions of the enemy, and to make frequent excursions in order to observe whether he is assembling troops or continues quiet in his quarters:

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But besides the chain of Infantry, it is also necessary that you should post at proper distances several brigades of Cavalry and Infantry, to be ready to support any part that may be attacked.

During the winters of 1744 and 1745, we formed the chain of quarters along the mountains which divide Silesia from Bohemia, and as we were extremely vigilant along our front, we continued uninterrupted. Lieut. General Truchses commanded along the confines of Lusatia as far as the county of Glatz, the town of Sagan, and the posts of Schmiedeberg as far as Friedland, which was fortified with redoubts. There were likewise some other small intrenched posts on the road to Schatzlar, Liebau, and Silberberg. General Truchses formed a reserve ready to sustain the first post that might be insulted. Each detachment was cover'd by trees cut down (*Abatis*) in the woods, all the roads leading to Bohemia

hemia were rendered impracticable, and every post had its Hussars for reconnoitring.

General Lehwald covered the county of Glatz with an equal body of troops, and with the same precautions. These two Generals were to act in consort, so that if the Austrians had marched against Truchses, Lehwald would instantly have entered Bohemia and fallen upon their rear; and so reciprocally.

In Upper Silesia we had the towns of Tropau and Jøgerndorf in front, and the communication passed thro' Ziegenhals and Patſchkau to Glatz, and thro' Neustadt to Neifs.

It may not be improper in this place to remind you, that mountains are no security; where goats can pass, a soldier may.

As to chains of winter quarters supported by fortified towns, I refer you to those

of Marſhal Saxe: They are the beſt; but as it is not always in our power to chuſe, we muſt form our chain according to our ſituation.

You are, by no means, in your range of quarters, to be too obſtinate for the ſake of one particular city, or poſt; provided it gives the enemy no power of being troubleſome: Tranquility is your principal object in winter quarters.

Let it be obſerved, as an invariable maxim, that your regiments be diſpoſed in brigades, that they may be always under the eye of a general officer. The ſervice alſo requires, that as often as it can be done, the regiments ſhould be diſtributed in ſuch a manner, that each may be under the command of its own chief.

With regard to ſubſiſtance of the troops in winter quarters, obſerve the following rules.

If

If circumstances are such, that you are obliged to winter in our own country, the officers are to be allowed a gratuity proportioned to their usual *douceurs*, and the private men are to receive their meat and bread gratis.

Your winter quarters being in an enemy's country, the commander in chief shall receive 15,000 florins; the Generals of horse and foot, each 10,000; Lieutenant Generals 7000; and Major Generals 5000; the captains of horse, each 2000; those of foot, 1800; and the subalterns 100 ducats. The men are to receive meat, bread, and beer, which are furnished by the country, but no money, for that encourages desertion. X

The commander in chief will take care, that these orders are regularly complied with, and that no pillaging be suffered; but there is no necessity for being too strict, with regard to any trifling profit which the officers may make.

If the army is quartered in an enemy's country, the commander in chief is to take care, that he is supplied with the necessary number of recruits. He will divide the province into a certain number of circles, allotting so many regiments to each, in proportion to the number of people, in the same manner as we enroll our recruits, in our own dominions.

If the states of the country are willing to furnish recruits, so much the better; but if they refuse, you must have recourse to violence. You must insist on their being delivered early in the winter, that you may have time to make soldiers of them before the spring. But this need not hinder the captains from sending out recruiting parties.

As the commander in chief ought to inspect the whole œconomy of his whole army, he must not forget to see that the horses for the artillery, and provisions which are

the tribute of the country, are regularly furnished, either in kind, or ready money. He will not fail likewise to see that the contributions are punctually paid into the military chest. It is the custom also, to make the country repair your waggons, and every other part of the apparatus of your army.

Moreover it is expected, that the General should carry his attention so far, as to be assured that the officers of Cavalry have caused their saddles, bridles, boots, &c. to be examined and repaired; and that those of the Infantry are sufficiently supplied with shoes, stockings, shirts, and garters, for the campaign. The tents and blankets of the soldiers are likewise to be repaired. The Cavalry are to furbish their swords, the Infantry to examine and mend their arms, and the artillery to provide them with a sufficient number of cartridges.

The General will also take care, that the Infantry, which forms the chain, are in no want of powder and ball, and in short, that nothing is wanting thro' the whole army.

If time will permit, the General would do well to visit his out-quarters, and examine the situation and condition of each, that he may be assured, that the officers do not neglect their duty. It is not only expected, that they should exercise the recruits, but all the troops under their command. There is nothing so destructive to an army as idleness.

Before the opening of the campaign, you will change quarters, so as to cantoon your troops in order of battle; *viz.* Infantry in the center, and Cavalry on each wing. These quarters of cantonnement are to extend about nine or ten leagues in front and about four in depth. But immediately before you take the field, you will contract them a little.

In

In quarters of cantonment, the army should be divided and disposed under the immediate command of the six oldest Generals. For instance, one commands the Cavalry of the right wing, another that of the left, and so on. By this means, all orders from the Chief will be more expeditiously conveyed, and the troops will more easily form their columns, when they are to take the field.

Before I quit this subject, it is necessary to warn you against precipitately establishing your winter quarters, before you are quite certain, that the enemy's troops are entirely separated. I would have you often to recollect what happened to the Elector Frederic William, when he was surprized by Turenne, in his quarters in Alsace.

A R T.



A R T. XXVIII.

Of Winter Campaigns.

WINTER campaigns are the ruin of your troops, not only on account of the sickness they occasion, but because, from your continual motion, they can neither be cloathed nor recruited. The same want of repose, prevents all your carriages, &c. from being properly repaired, and ends in their total destruction.

Nothing can be more certain, than that the best army in the world cannot long support such campaigns; for which reason, winter expeditions ought by all means to be avoided: not but there is a possibility of a General being so circumstanced, as to be obliged to have recourse to that kind of ruinous war.

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I believe that I have made more winter campaigns, than any General of the present age. It may not be improper to give some reason for my conduct.

At the death of the Emperor Charles VI. in 1740, there were no more than two Austrian regiments in Silesia. Being determined to assert my right to that Dutchy, I was obliged to make war during the winter, that I might take the advantage of circumstance, and make the banks of the Neiss the scene of action. If I had waited till the spring, we should have begun the war between Grossen and Glogau, and what we gained by one single march, would certainly have cost us three or four difficult campaigns. It should seem, that this will be thought a sufficient reason.

If I did not succeed in the winter campaign of 1742, which I made with a design to deliver the country belonging to
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the Elector of Bavaria, it was because the French acted like fools, and the Saxons like traitors.

In the winter of 1745-6, I made my third winter campaign. The Austrians having got possession of Silesia, it was necessary to drive them out.

In the beginning of the winter of 1746, the Austrians and the Saxons formed a design to enter my hereditary dominions, with a design to destroy them with fire and sword. I was beforehand with them. I carried the war into the heart of Saxony.

If the like occasions were again to offer, I should act in the same manner, and should approve such conduct in any of my Generals.

As to what regards the detail of such campaigns, you must endeavour to conduct your march, that your quarters of cantonment

ment may lie as compact as possible; three or four regiments of Cavalry in each village, together with some Infantry, if it can possibly contain them. It may sometimes be convenient to quarter your whole Infantry in one town, as was practised by the Prince of Anhalt, at Torgau, Eilenbourg, Meissen, and in two or three other small towns in Saxony, the names of which I have forgotten; after which he took the field.

When you approach the enemy, you appoint a place of rendezvous for the troops, and march in columns, as usual; and when you come to the last decisive movement, that is, to force the enemy's quarters, or march to give him battle, you will then encamp in order of battle. Each company must be allowed to light a fire to warm themselves during the night. But the hardship and fatigue of such enterprizes are too violent for human nature to support them long; therefore it is necessary that you
should

should move with all possible expedition. No hesitation, no delay upon these occasions. Your resolutions must be firm, and executed like a flash of lightning.

Winter expeditions are impracticable in a country where there are many fortified towns, as in that season sieges are impossible.

When there are no very powerful motives for the contrary, it is always best to appropriate the winter season to the re-establishment, revival, and repose of your troops, so that you may be able, in the spring, to take the field before the enemy.

These I believe are the principles, upon which are founded the grand manoeuvres in the art of war, the maxims of which I have, in these pages, endeavoured to explain and illustrate. I have particularly aimed at precision and perspicuity; nevertheless, if any thing should seem not sufficiently clear,
you

you will give me pleasure in communicating your doubts, that I may either entirely remove them, or conform to your better opinion.

The little experience which I have acquired in war, has convinced me, that the study of that art is inexhaustible, and that time and application will always produce new discoveries.

For my own part, I shall think that I have not misemployed my time, if this work should excite in my officers, the desire of studying a profession, which will open to them the most brilliant path to glory, rescue them from oblivion, and enable them, by their actions, to acquire immortal reputation.

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MAXIMS and INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE
LIGHT TROOPS,
And all OFFICERS commanding in
DETACHMENT.

C H A P. I.

The Duty of an Officer commanding an Advanced-Guard.

I.

HIS first care must be, to surround his post with a chain of sentries, or Videtts, in such a manner, that nothing can possibly approach him without his knowledge. Videtts are to be double, and at least one of them must be a man that may safely be depended on. Sentries and Videtts are to be well instructed in their duty; for

for the officer must answer for the consequences of their ignorance.

II.

In an open country, your grand guard should be advanced about five hundred paces in the front of the army, and in such a manner, as to have all its Videtts in view. It may sometimes be adviseable, to post guards on the verge of a wood, or side of a hill, so as they may observe the enemy without being seen.

III.

In the day time, in an open country, where the grand guard is within view of the out posts and Videtts; the guard may be suffered to dismount, and even feed; but if the country be inclosed, and your view not extensive, at least half the guard must continue mounted.

IV.

On the approach of a General Officer, the whole guard mounts, that they may receive him properly.

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As soon as it grows dark, the out-posts and Videtts are to be posted two or three hundred paces nearer the guard; but if the grand-guard be too weak to allow a sufficient number of out-posts, it will be proper to send out frequent patrols of a Corporal and two, who are to make a circle of two hundred paces beyond the Videtts.

VI.

The officer, commanding the grand guard, will give a watch-word to the out-posts, which the Corporal of each patrol will bring during the night, and which must be changed after every desertion.

VII.

During the night, the whole guard must remain mounted, unless there happens to be a défilé in front, in which case it may be sufficient to detach a subaltern with a small party, which must be frequently relieved;

lieved; he must keep a constant succession of patrols in his front.

VIII.

These precautions being taken, the guard may dismount: but the Hussars are to have hold of their bridles, ready to mount upon the least alarm.

IX.

The out-post must not be trusted with the parole, but they must have the watch-word.

X.

No Detachment, or Relief, must be suffered to pass the Guard, before they have been regularly examined by a Non-commission'd Officer, even tho' they should give the *Word*; and tho' they should give a wrong Watch-word, you are not to fire, provided they halt; but if they continue to advance, you are to charge them immediately.

XI.

As the safety of the whole army depends upon the officer who commands the advanced guard, he ought not to suffer himself to be surprized, on pain of being cashiered. If he is attacked, he must make all the resistance in his power, and when he is obliged by superior force to give way, he must continue to skirmish with the enemy as he retires.

XII.

Patroles are to be sent out, every two hours, towards the enemy; or, if the two armies are near, every hour. This is most necessary in the evening, and at break of day.

XIII.

Nothing being more easy, than for the enemy to get between an advanced guard and the army, you must endeavour to secure your rear by constant patroles, and
order

order your out-posts to join the guard, the moment they hear your firing, without waiting for orders.

XIV.

Relieve your Videtts every hour.

XV.

The officer of the guard reports to the General every extraordinary occurrence.

XVI.

In winter, when it is very cold, you may suffer the guard to make a small fire; but it must be either in a hollow, or in a hole dug on purpose, that it may not be observed by the enemy.

C H A P. II.

The Duty of an Hussar, on guard, and as Videt.

IF at any time an Hussar dismounts, he ought by no means to leave his horse, and if he takes the bitt out of his mouth,

he should fasten the reins in such a manner, as to be able to bridle at a moment's warning. Being posted as Videt, he must not dismount, nor sleep, but be continually upon the watch. In the day time, as soon as he observes any thing extraordinary, in the motions of the enemy, either he, or his comrade rides off, and reports what he has seen to his officer; but, during the night, as soon as they perceive any object moving towards them, one of the two must advance and challenge: If, after having challenged three times, he receives no answer, or a false watch-word, he must fire his piece, and retire with his comrade towards the guard, in case the enemy should advance; but if they move off, one of the Videts reports to the officer, and the other remains upon his post.

It being supposed, that one of the two Videts is a man to be depended on, the officer will remember to give him orders, that when he has any thing to report, he must
always

always dispatch his comrade to the guard, lest being left alone he might desert.

The two Videts ought never to separate, unless when one goes with a report to the guard. If one of them should attempt to desert, the other must instantly blow out his brains; for he must be answerable for the fidelity of his comrade.

The manner of challenging is as follows, *Who comes there? Who comes there?* (answer) *Patrol!—Advance Patrol! give the Word.* He must not suffer the Patrol to advance within twenty paces of his post, till he has heard the watch-word.

If, during the night, any troops should approach, above three in number, tho' they should answer properly, he must not suffer them to advance, till he has reported to his officer, who will cause them to be examined.

The Videts must neither make a fire, nor smook tobacco, during the night: It is also necessary, that they should remain quite silent, as their chief dependance must be on their ear.



C H A P. III.

The Duty of a Commission'd or Non-commission'd Officer in Patrolling.

AN officer patrolling, must detach a small party in front, as an advanced-guard, and also upon each flank; but these parties are to consist of very few men, as it is always prudent to keep the main body as strong as possible. When these detached parties fall in with the enemy, they are to fire their pieces, and retire immediately to the main body.

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They are to pass no house, copse, thicket or valley, without reconnoitring; for this reason the patrol must advance slowly.

The officer, who is sent out upon any duty whatsoever, must adhere strictly to his orders, without considering consequences. If, for instance, he is ordered to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, he must endeavour to get imperceptibly between their posts, and return as soon as he has seen what he was sent to discover, without attempting any thing farther.

But if an officer should be detached, with an intent to discover the strength of the enemy, he will probably have orders to attack their Videts and out-posts, as that will oblige them to make a general movement, which may discover their force. In this case, he must not penetrate too far, lest he should be cut off. If, after his attack, he has the opportunity of retiring into a wood,

wood, he may be very certain of not being pursued.

If a patrol should be attacked in front, or in flank, the officer must above all things take care that his retreat be not cut off.

In case you are hard pressed in your retreat, you are to be particularly careful not to retire in too great a hurry, lest you should blow your horses, and by that means sacrifice your whole party; but if you should perceive, that the horses of your pursuers are more fatigued than your own, you will then retire as leisurely as possible, that your flanking parties may have time to fall into the road, and form a kind of rear guard.

If, in your retreat, you have a *defilé* to pass, you are to proceed with all possible expedition, till you have got thro'; you are then to face about, and fire briskly upon your pursuers, which will probably stop them for a while. By thus disputing the *defilé*,

defilé, your horses will recover their wind, and be able to continue the retreat.

If, notwithstanding all his precautions, an officer of Hussars should find himself surrounded by the enemy, his only resource is, to collect his whole party, and without hesitation, cut his way thro': He will by this means save most of his people, whereas if he suffers them to disperse, they will be picked up by the enemy, one after another.

You are to be extreamly careful in examining your guides, and if any Hussar should bring you false intelligence, let him be instantly and severely chastised.



C H A P. IV.

*Rules for the Conduct of a private Hussar,
patrolling, or flanking.*

AN Hussar should be all eye: Nothing, either before, behind, or on either side, should escape his observation. Being ordered

dered to reconnoitre a wood or village, he must proceed with extraordinary circumspection, seize the first peasant he sees, and lead him to his officer.

He must not, by any means, alight from his horse, or stop at an alehouse to drink. He must stop all travellers, whether on horse-back, or in carriages, and conduct them to his officer.

The flanking Hussars should endeavour to assist each other, in case any of them are attacked. They are on no account to surrender themselves to the enemy, so long as there is the least possibility of their being supported, unless they should be dangerously wounded, or their horses shot. They must be careful not to fatigue their horses without reason.

A flanking Hussar must be constantly attentive to the call, and join the troop the moment he hears it. When there is no trumpet
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in the detachment, he will be directed by such other cries or signals, as have been previously settled.

When on the flank of the detachment, he must mount every hill, which is not at too great a distance from the line of march, and he must remain on the top of the hill till the detachment comes a-breast with him, or till he is relieved by another.

He must always have his carbine or pistol ready to fire at a moment's warning, and his sabre hanging at his wrist. Having passed thro' a village, he must ascend the first hill he comes to, and remain on the top till the detachment has passed.

He must be extremely careful not to bring false intelligence, to avoid which he must report nothing without having himself examined every particular; and in case it appears to be a matter of doubt, he must report it as such to his officer.

CHAP.



CHAP. V.

Instructions for an Officer, commanding a Reconnoitring Detachment.

IT is previously necessary, that the officer should be well acquainted with the country, the roads, and the distance of the enemy.

His party must consist of men of approved fidelity, part of whom must be disguised.

This detachment must march off in the night. The men are to have strict orders neither to smoke tobacco, nor speak.

He must be provided with two guides, who are to be strictly interrogated, but are to remain ignorant of the rout you intend

to take. But if any of your Hussars are acquainted with the country, they are the best guides.

A faithful spy is also of great use on these occasions ; but these are rarely to be had, except by dint of money.

You must detach a non-commission'd officer, with three or four men and a guide, who are to march a little way in front of the party. This non-commission'd officer must keep a good look-out, and from time to time report his observations to the commanding officer. When he is in danger of being observed by the enemy, he must retreat silently, and the whole party will then file off to the right or left, and let the enemy pass.

During the night, the officer will preserve his communication with his advanced guard, by causing a few men to march between them at the distance of thirty or
forty

forty paces from each other. These men are to have strict orders not to challenge when the serjeant of the advanced guard sends any one with a report to his officer.

It is very necessary, during the night, to be attentive that the men do not sleep, lest those in the rear should be left behind, and lost.

In case you find that you are discovered by the enemy, and consequently that your scheme is frustrated, your best way is to return immediately. But if you should already have passed the chain of the enemy, and are thence in danger of having your retreat cut off, you will, in that case, turn to the right or left, and endeavour to retire by another road; but, as this cannot be effected during the day, you must conceal yourself in some neighbouring wood, till the night following,

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When you come near the enemy, without being discovered, you must send some of your Hussars disguised, who are to learn, from the peasants, the situation of the enemy; but, to prevent suspicion, they are not to take the direct road.

Whilst, in the day time, you conceal yourself in the woods, you are to fix sentries in the tops of the highest trees.

A Detachment of this kind, should be furnished with subsistence for two or three days. The horses are to be fed every two or three leagues, for it is absolutely necessary, that they should be always fresh, and fit for duty. The officer will take care never to halt, but at a distance from any road, and also to take every precaution to prevent his being surprized, whilst his horses are feeding.

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In case he should be in want of forrage, or provisions, he must send, to the nearest village, a non-commissioned officer, and three or four disguised Hussars, with orders to collect what is wanted, to pay for the provisions, and give receipts for the forrage, that you may be supposed to be their friends. The peasants are to be discharged, as soon as they have delivered the forrage, &c. at the place where you halted. The best time to do this is towards evening. As soon as you are thus provided, you are to continue your march.

The officer, who commands such a detachment, must always be certain, as to the distance of the enemy; that, in case of necessity, he may retreat in time. If the roads are good, he may march about two leagues an hour. He must never halt in a village.

If he should be attacked by a superior force, if there are no woods near, he need not be afraid of retreating across a plain, provided he has been careful of his horses, as those of the enemy may probably be fatigued, if they have been out for any time in quest of him. He must by no means forget to appoint a place of rendezvous, in case his troop should be dispersed.

A watch, and a compass, are extremely necessary upon these secret expeditions. X

In all your enquiries, concerning the road, you are always to inform yourself of five or six different ways, to prevent the peasants from forming any idea of your real design.

When you are obliged to take any of the peasants as guides, you are to watch them carefully, and not dismiss them, till you

have fed your horses, and are going to march towards the enemy, that they may not be before you with their intelligence. It may sometimes be advisable to bribe them with presents, to give false information.



C H A P. VI.

The Duty of a Non-commissioned Officer, or private Hussar, when he happens to be separated from his Party.

HE must conceal himself in the woods till night, and must then endeavour to return by some indirect rout, avoiding, as much as possible, villages and great roads. He will always find sufficient forage for his horse, and as to himself, he must rather suffer a little hunger, than enter into any village, till he can do it with safety.

If

If he is at any time doubtful of the road, he must enquire of the shepherds, or at a remote cottage. And if he finds himself entirely cut off from the army, he may then join the enemy, as a deserter, till he has an opportunity of rejoining his corps.



C H A P. VII.

How to act in Detachment, with a force superior to that of the enemy.

WE must previously consider, whether the affair is offensive, or defensive; whether designed, or unexpected; whether you have Infantry at a certain distance, and whether your rear be securely covered.

If the affair be offensive, and predetermined, as for example, in case I am resolved to attack the enemy in his camp, I ought to be assured, that my force is superior to his,

and that there is a probability of surprizing him, before he will have time to form. Attacks of this kind will succeed in proportion to the velocity with which they are made. Before you attack, it is prudent to post some of your foot-hunters at the first defilé in your rear, to cover your retreat, in case of a repulse. If the enemy is encamped in an open plain, you are to attack their advanced guard with all imaginable impetuosity, and to enter their camp pel-mel, before they have time to mount their horses, putting all you meet to the sword. During this attack, your second line will halt in the front of the enemy's camp, ready to cover your retreat, or give you an opportunity of rallying.

If you succeed in your attempt, after having hamstrung the horses, you will set fire to their camp; but you are to take all possible care, to prevent your people from straggling in search of plunder. When the affair is entirely over, and the enemy have

have no prospect of assistance, you may then collect as many prisoners as you conveniently can, otherwise prisoners are so very troublesome, that it seems more advisable to put them to the sword, unless you have a mind to spare the officers.

If it is possible to get round the enemy, it is best to attack them in the rear; as you there find less resistance, you will certainly succeed, especially if you make your attack just before break of day.

After you are in peaceable possession of the enemy's camp, the most equitable method is to collect all the booty, and then to distribute it to those who have shewn most resolution during the attack. The officers are to have the privilege of chusing what they want, but they are to pay for what they take, according to a moderate general tax fixed upon each article, by which means the officers will have an opportunity of providing themselves with horses, &c. at

an easy expence, and the private men will be rewarded according to their merit.]

If each man was suffered to retain what he took, the bravest of them would gain the least, as they were too intent upon driving the enemy, to concern themselves with plunder, whilst the most cowardly would carry off all the spoil. Nevertheless there are cases in which an Hussar ought to keep what he has got, provided it appears to be the immediate consequence of his singular bravery.

As soon as the enemy perceives your superiority, unless he happens to be advantageously situated, he will most certainly go to the right about; therefore, when you approach his camp, you must conceal your force, by marching few squadrons in front, and closing the intervals between each.

If, when you come within fifteen hundred paces of the enemy, you perceive them inclined

inclined to move off, you must order your advanced guard to gallop forward, and keep them in play, till you have time to come up with the whole detachment. As you advance, you will detach a squadron from each wing to fall upon their flank.

But if the enemy should have had prudence enough to retire in time, it will answer no purpose to pursue them, except with your advanced guard, in order to pick up a few stragglers.

In pursuing the enemy, you are to be very cautious in entering woods, inclosures, or defilés, lest you should fall into an ambuscade. If the enemy should have been so imprudent as not to guard the defilé in their rear with infantry, if you come up with them before they have had time to pass it, they must either be cut to pieces, or surrender themselves prisoners of war. In that case you are to give them quarter.

But

But it is a difficult matter to know whether a defilé be guarded, or not. If they face about and appear determined, there is reason to believe the pass is guarded; but the best method of discovering the truth of this matter is, to march slow, as soon as the enemy has faced about, and to order your flanking parties to advance briskly, and reconnoitre the defilé. In the mean time you will interrogate your prisoners, and threaten to blow out their brains, in case their intelligence should prove false; and you must keep your word with them.

If the enemy has one or more defilés in front, and an open country in his rear, tho' his force should be much inferior to yours, it is dangerous to attack him, unless by surprize; for the first troops which should attempt to pass, must infallibly be routed, before they could be sustained, and the enemy, having nothing to impede his
retreat,

retreat, would retire without danger, after having destroyed part of your troops.

But in case you can discover, that the enemy has neglected any one of the defilés in his front, you will then order part of your detachment to pass that way, and as soon as they have had time to come round, make a vigorous attack upon those defilés which are guarded.

In all these cases, it is very necessary to know the troops you are about to insult. If they are Dragoons, which are generally brave, and well mounted, you must expect an obstinate resistance, and may possibly be obliged to abandon your enterprize.

If I have intelligence of a detachment of the enemy's Cavalry being in a neighbouring village, I naturally conclude, that they are there, either with a design to repose themselves for a few hours, or to levy contributions. In either case it is probable,
as

as they mean to continue there but a short time, that the precautions they have taken, are designed rather to prevent their being surprized, than to oppose the enemy, in case of an attack. Let us suppose, therefore, that they have posted a small guard at the entrance of the village, and a sentry on the church-steeple. Their horses are linked in the center of the village, under the guard of a few men, whilst the rest are enjoying themselves in the houses: Or at least half of them are dismounted. On this supposition, my first business would be to post half my party between the village, and the army of the enemy. I would then attack their guard on the opposite side, and endeavour to enter the village pel-mel, along with them. Those that were mounted, would certainly make the best of their way to the army, and they would as certainly fall into the hands of the other half of my detachment. But in case the enemy should resolve to maintain their post, or advance to meet me, my party in their
rear

rear must then force their way into the village. If there should be a third road, the enemy will probably endeavour to escape thro' it, but they will suffer considerably in their retreat. Such attacks are generally successful, but such opportunities are very rare.

One may venture upon these attacks without running much risk, even tho' the nature of the ground will not permit you to post part of your detachment between the village and the enemy's camp; because their fears will greatly multiply your numbers. If you attack a village in the night, you must order your men to put white paper in their hats, that they may distinguish each other from the enemy.

With regard to the stratagems, by which it is possible to draw the enemy into an ambuscade, they are innumerable. A fertile genius will vary them almost to infinity. One of the most common, and which, nevertheless,

vertheless, frequently succeeds, is to detach an officer, with a small party, to insult the enemy, with orders to retire, when pursued, and by that means gradually decoy his pursuers into a defilé, both sides of which are lined with musketry. But, in attempts of this nature, your main body must be so near the ambuscade, as to be ready to support your Infantry, in case the enemy should have perceived your design, and fall upon their rear. The officer, who advances, must march very slow, lest his horses should be out of wind before he begins the retreat. If he falls in with any waggons, in sight of the enemy, he must seem to plunder them; but lest no such opportunity should offer, it may not be improper to cause a few waggons to proceed from a neighbouring village, for that purpose. And if this will not do, he may then appear to have advanced with an intention to discover the position of the enemy, and if they should continue inflexible, he may attack their advanced guard.

Another method of decoying the enemy, is to send forty or fifty men into a village, not far from their camp, whilst you take post with your whole detachment on the out skirts, so as not to be perceived by the inhabitants. The subaltern, who is sent into the village, must dismount his troop, but not suffer the men to quit their horses. He will then assemble the Bailiff and the peasants, and order them to provide a certain quantity of forrage, which they are to transport in three or four hours, from that time. His next business is, to dispatch some of them to the neighbouring villages, with the like orders, with positive commands, not to give the enemy intelligence of his being there; or in case they should be obliged to own it, to report his party much stronger than it is. These messengers being dispatched, he must suffer no one to leave the village. In the mean while, he will collect as much forrage as he can; his Videts are to be so posted, as to give intel-

intelligence of the enemy's approach, and the main body are to continue in their ambuscade, in the out skirts of the place.

When the enemy appears (which they will not fail to do) he must endeavour to carry off his forrage, till he has drawn them to the place prepared for their reception, upon which he will face about, and stop them till the troops in ambuscade have time to attack them in flank.




C H A P. VIII.

Hussars against Cavalry, or Dragoons.

CURASSIERS, and Dragoons, being mounted upon stronger horses than those of Hussars, you must always endeavour to avoid charging them in front, and for that purpose, you must dispatch part of your force, to fall upon their flanks, which will probably oblige them to face to the right

right or left, which must be your signal for a general charge. This will probably throw them into some confusion, and then you will find great advantage in the agility of your horses.

It is a very easy matter for Hussars to attack heavy Cavalry in an open plain, provided they can fall upon one of its wings. If they should seem determined to charge you in front, you must then separate into small parties, and endeavour to fall upon their flanks and rear, which will soon oblige them either to retire, or make some false movement, which may possibly turn to your advantage. If their flanks are secured, it were highly imprudent to attack them at all.



C H A P. IX.

How to act against a Detachment of Hussars of equal Force.

A Hussar ought never to engage his entire strength, unless he is morally certain

tain of carrying his point; for it is less to the dishonour of an officer of Hussars to make a prudent retreat, than to engage in a disadvantageous affair. Irrational ardour is always reproachable. But, in case he is perfectly acquainted with the strength of the enemy, is certain that there is no ambuscade, and that his own people are to be depended on, he may then risk a general attack.



C H A P. X.

Of a general Attack.

TH E commander of a detachment of Hussars, if he intends a general attack, must, in a great measure regulate his motions by those of the enemy; he must take care to present them a straight line, and endeavour, if possible, to turn one of their flanks.

When the enemy is formed in two lines, there is no doubt but you must draw up
in

in the same manner ; and indeed I am of opinion, that it is always best to attack in two lines.

The distance, from the first line to the second, is from two to three hundred paces.

You are to form two or three small troops in the rear of each wing, which are to flank the enemy during the attack, pursue them when routed, or retard them if victorious.

The officer, who commands in chief, having made the necessary dispositions, he will communicate his design to the commanders of each squadron, and inform them explicitly concerning the part which they are to act. He will give the command of the second line to the most experienced officer of the party.

In moving towards the enemy, he will begin with a slow pace ; he will then trot,

and when he comes within two hundred paces of the enemy, he will canter, and at the distance of one hundred paces, he will give the words *March! March!* and instantly strike into a full gallop.


The second line will proceed in the same manner, and make their attack thro' the intervals of the first, in case the enemy is not overthrown by the first shock.

In all such attacks, it is the duty of the commander in chief, as well as the commanders of squadrons, to put themselves at the head of their people, as it will add greatly to their courage. As to the danger of an officer thus advanced before the line, it is by no means so great as is imagined: for supposing the shock should be quite perfect, which very seldom happens, the motion is so extremely rapid, that there is scarce an instant of time between the shock of the officers, and that of the ranks.

In

In an attack, where the whole is not engaged, the commander may remain in the rear, provided his courage is sufficiently known to the men. Besides his Aid de Camp, he must be attended by an orderly man from each squadron, that, in case of need, his orders may spread at the same instant thro' the whole line.

One invariable rule is, that you are always to give the shock to the enemy, and never wait to be attacked.



C H A P. XI.

The Duty of the Officer who commands the second line.

THE commanding officer of the second line, must be extreamly attentive to the success of the first. If the enemy should retire, there is no necessity for him to en-

gage. If but one wing of the enemy should give way, he will halt the line, and be prepared to support the other wing of the first line, in case it should be obliged to give ground.

If the first line should meet with a stout resistance, he must then march instantly to its support, and charge thro' the intervals.

If he should perceive a design in the enemy to turn the flank of the first line, he will dispatch those squadrons which are nearest, to flank the enemy in turn, retaining only a single Hussar of each squadron to carry orders.



C H A P. XII.

The Duty of the Commanders of Squadrons in the Attack.

THE commanding officer must charge at the head of his squadron, encourage his people, and instantly execute the orders

orders of the commander in chief. He must be careful not to break the line, nor close the intervals, and as it is impossible always to hear the words of command, in cases of doubt, he must be governed by his eye, and endeavour to act in concert with the majority. He will do all in his power to make his squadron preserve a straight line, and to prevent their talking as they advance.

In an old regiment, a Captain ought to be answerable for the behaviour of his men, as it may reasonably be presumed, if they should not perform their duty, that he has not acted justly in raising the men, providing the horses, or been negligent in the discipline of both.

Some people are yet in doubt, whether the ancient or modern methods of attack are really best: that is, whether it be most advantageous to advance in a brisk trot, close locked, or in full gallop, with the

files rather more at liberty. But from the known laws of motion, considering a squadron as a machine, it is demonstrable, that our weight or power augments in proportion as we increase our celerity, and therefore, that if two squadrons of equal strength were to charge each other, that whose motion is the quickest will infallibly bear down the other. As to the fire of a squadron advancing to charge, whether trotting or galloping, it deserves no consideration.

It is true, the Swedish Cavalry, under Charles XII. were generally victorious, tho' they attacked in the old way; but we must remember, that the Cavalry of the enemy used, for a long time, to fire their carbines, that after experience had convinced them of their error in that respect, their dread of the Swedish Cavalry still continued, and that the Swedes fought in the presence of their King. On the other hand, the enemy, either for want of experience, or from some other cause, seldom behaved well; how
could

could it otherwise have happened, that at the battle of Fraustad, a regiment of Swedish Cavalry, mounted upon small horses unshod, should have overthrown one of the best regiments among the Saxon troops?

In our days, things are greatly altered. Cavalry in general is considerably improved; so that we have nothing to hope from the weakness of our enemy.

During this war, on a grand forrage near Fehrbellin, a squadron of Hussars, of Moring's regiment, mounted upon small horses, fatigued by a long march, bore down a squadron of Smoland's dragoons: And yet these Dragoons were certainly brave, for there was not a single man of them all who was not wounded; but they made their attack after the ancient manner, and therefore they were defeated.



C H A P. XIII.

The Conduct of a Subaltern or Non-commissioned Officer.


THE officers who are posted on the flanks of the squadron, are, in advancing, to fix their eyes upon some object exactly in front, which will enable them to keep the squadron from swerving to the right or left.

He must be constantly attentive to the commands of his Captain, do all he can to make the men keep their ranks, and be silent.

The officers, and not commissioned officers in the rear, are to take care that no Hussar falls back upon any pretence, during the

the attack. If any of them should turn their backs upon the enemy, the officers in rear must instantly blow out their brains.

If any Hussar should attempt to amuse himself, during the attack, with plundering or taking of horses, let him be deprived of his plunder, and severely punished ; otherwise the brave will always be robbed of their booty by the most cowardly.



C H A P. XIV.

The Conduct of an Hussar in the Attack.

IT is expected, that each private Hussar should be very attentive to the words of command, and that all his manoeuvres should be performed with the utmost alacrity and expedition. He must ride with a tight rein, and in wheeling press towards the wheeling center, and look outwards.

In

In attacking of Cavalry or Infantry, when he comes within a few paces of the enemy, he must clap spurs to his horse, dart forwards with all his might, and having overturned his opponents rejoin his troop. In the instant of attack, he must not spare his enemy, nor think of giving quarter, till they are entirely put to flight.

If he is ordered to attack the enemy in flank, he may first fire his piece, and if that should have no effect, he must ride briskly, and endeavour to kill the officer or serjeant.

If he should be attacked in flank, he must be careful not to fire his piece, till he can make sure of his man.

It is the duty of an Hussar, never to lag behind, nor abandon his officers, upon pain of the most severe punishment. He must
be

be determined to sell his life as dear as possible, and never ask for quarter, untill he is dangerously wounded, and has no hopes of assistance.



C H A P. XV.

The Duty of the Commander of a Detachment of Hussars, posted in a Village near the Army, whether incamped, or in cantonment.

TH E S E detachments being posted for the security of the army, the commanding officer will take every imaginable precaution to prevent surprize.

Having received orders to take post in such a village, his first care must be to cause it to be reconnoitred, but before his people enter the village, he is to post a small party on the opposite side, to prevent the inhabitants from carrying intelligence

gence to the enemy. In the mean while, till his patroles return, he may feed his horses, and refresh his men, but without suffering any of them to stir from their horses.

If, from the report of his patrol, he finds any unexpected defect in his position, he may continue to halt, till he has reported the particulars, and his opinion of the matter, to the General.

Having taken post in the village, he must take such precautions for his security, that when his horses are unfaddled, he may have a quarter of an hour's notice of the approach of the enemy; but when his horses remain faddled, eight minutes previous information is sufficient.

It is not expected, that a Hussar should defend his post against a superior force. As in this situation, his duty is chiefly to observe and amuse the enemy, the service he is

is to render, depends rather upon the disposition than the strength of his out-posts, which ought to form a continued chain, so as to make it impossible for the enemy to approach, without being observed.

Pl. XIV. In the plate here referred to, there are three different stations. N^o. 1. is a village, distant a quarter of a mile from the left wing of the army, which is encamped near the town A. C. In this village I have posted four squadrons of Hussars.

Upon the left runs a rivulet, over which there are three bridges, *a b* and *c*. *a* and *b* having no communication with each other.

The right flank is covered by the posts N^o. 2 and 3.

At *a* I post a Serjeant and six men, who, after having broken the bridge, posts his
Videtts

Videts in such a manner, as to observe every thing that passes on the opposite side. This out-guard must continue mounted during the night, make no fire, and patrol along the banks of the rivulet from the time it grows dark.

His out-guard must be sustained by another, consisting of an officer and twenty men, which is to take post at C, and from which the other must be relieved every four hours. This officer will send out constant patrols, and report to the Captain of the piquet, or otherwise to the commanding officer in the village. This officer may light a fire, and feed his horses, but half of them are to remain bridled during the night.

I post another of these out-guards at *b* and also at *c*, which differ only from the first, in that there is a village on the other side of the rivulet, of which the enemy may possibly take possession. Therefore, I post

a Videt on a height on the other side of the village, with orders to retire during the night, and to take up a few planks of the bridge. As often as this guard hears any unusual noise, as the barking of dogs, &c. in the village, the Serjeant must report it to the officer.

These two guards which have a communication with each other, are sustained by the detachment *e*, which consists of an officer and thirty eight men, under the same orders with that at C.

As in this situation it is hardly possible to be surprized, there is no necessity for sending constant patrols at the break of day, without particular orders; but whenever it is thought necessary, they are to proceed with the utmost precaution, guarded by flanking parties, and when they have passed the bridge, they are to leave it guarded by Foot-hunters, or dismounted Hussars,

P

who

who are to take up the planks as soon as the patrol has repassed.

Our flank being secured by the detachment N^o. 2, let us consider the precautions necessary to be taken in the village. In the first place, each entrance must be barricaded by ladders fastened to pikes drove into the ground, or by a chain of waggons, or by cross ditches; but the road by which you intend to fall, must be secured by waggons loaded with dung, which may be easily removed, and which, in case of necessity, will serve as a parapet, behind which you may make a stout defence, if you should be attacked.

You will post at each entrance a Corporal and four men, and mount a Captain's piquet in the center of the place.

In case there should not be a sufficient number of barns in the village, part of your horses must stand in the open air, it
being

being by no means advisable to crowd many horses into stables, the doors of which will admit only one at a time.

Your horses must be all saddled at sunset, when the piquet turns out. In the night, the first pop of a musket is a signal for the piquet to march out of the village, and for the trumpet to sound *To Horse*, upon which the whole must assemble upon the parade.

Hussars, above all other troops, ought to be accustomed to form instantaneously; for which reason, it is advisable to rouse them by false alarms, and to punish the most dilatory.

During the night, an orderly man of each squadron must remain in or near his Captain's quarters, ready to give notice as soon as he hears any firing at a distance. Those who have unsaddled their horses, must take special care that their accoutrements, pistols, bridles, &c. are hung up in such a manner,

that in case of necessity they may find them in the dark.

An Hussar must always carry his carbine and sabre about with him, and must never strip, except to change his linen.

One orderly trumpet must attend the commander in chief; the rest remain with their respective Captains.

The horses must be all saddled and bridled a little before break of day.

It is a fault to fatigue your people without cause; therefore, when you have the advantage of any heights in your neighbourhood, which command a tolerable extent of country, you may ease the corps, by lessening the guards and sentries in the day time, in clear weather.

If you have any Infantry, you will post them so as to defend the entrance of the village,

village, till your Huffars are prepared to receive the enemy; you will quarter them at the extremity of the village, and their alarm post must be in the church yard. In this case, your piquets may be dispensed with, and you may suffer your squadrons to unsaddle in the day time.

If you have any heavy Cavalry, they are to form the nearest guard; but your Huffars are to patrole and form all the advanced posts.

Pl. XIV. N^o. 2. is a village in the plain, whose left is covered by N^o. 1, and its right by N^o. 3, and a morass. The front is entirely open. In this village I will suppose you have posted four or six squadrons. The post A must be occupied by a Captain and forty, and B by a subaltern and thirty. These are to preserve a communication with each other, by their detachments O. D. E. The Videts and patroles of these detachments are, upon the first at-

tack, to retire to their respective corps, and if the enemy should appear too formidable, the detachments themselves must retire to the village.

On the other side of the village, I post an officer with twenty eight men at F, who will detach a serjeant and eight to G.

Posts of this nature are considerably strengthened by a mixture of Infantry, and even a few field pieces, which in the day time are to be planted at the entrance of the village towards the enemy, and in the night, in the church yard.

No. 3 is a village near a wood, thro' which are several roads. Here I post two guards at *a a* and *b b*, which are to send out frequent patrols, and are to continue mounted during the night. They are not to unsaddle at all,

It

It is unnecessary to guard the entrance of this village, as it may be approached on every side. If you have no Infantry, it is best to retire into the plain during the night. In this situation, a party of Foot-hunters may be extremely useful, if properly posted in the wood; but in case they are obliged to retreat, it would be ungenerous to abandon them, as they must be greatly exposed in crossing the plain.

By these different positions, I have endeavoured to shew the methods of guarding against surprize, without fatiguing your people: and I have nothing to add, except that when you are forced to give way to superiority of numbers, you are to retire to the piquets of the army, and under cover of their fire prevent the enemy from approaching too near the line.



C H A P. XVI.

*Conduēt of the Commander of a Regiment,
Squadron, or Detachment of Hussars, when
the Army is in Winter Quarters.*

THE several posts which he is appointed to guard being fixt, he will augment or diminish their strength, as he shall find necessary.

The disposition within his quarters is the same as before directed; but as neither men nor horses can continue for any time in the open air, during the winter, he must have with him a small detachment of Infantry, ready to amuse the enemy till the Hussars have time to bring out their horses and mount. These Infantry are to be quartered at the extremities of the village, where they are to throw up *fleches* or redoubts for their security.

As

As in the winter time, there are some morasses which do not freeze sufficiently to support your patrols of Hussars, and which nevertheless are passable for the enemy's foot, it is necessary that you should send out, in the night, frequent patrols of Infantry, so long as the frost continues.

But these precautions are by no means a sufficient security for an army in winter quarters. The commander in chief must spare no expence to support a number of spies in the enemy's quarters, who are to give constant intelligence of all their motions.



C H A P. XVII.

In what manner to attack Hussars in Quarters.

THESE attacks must be regulated according to the strength, disposition, and situation of the enemy; but they seldom

dom succeed, unless it is in your power to surprize the village, in consequence of their negligence.

Having approached the place without being discovered, it is necessary that you should have peasants of a neighbouring village to break down the hedges; otherwise you must order your advanced-guard to fire upon the enemy, after having advanced to within a few paces of their barrier, and as soon as they are gone to the right about, some of your Hussars must dismount, and clear the way for the rest to enter the village, where you must put all the private men you meet to the sword, and endeavour to seize as many officers as you can.

If you are superior to the enemy in point of numbers, you must suffer none of them to escape; but when that is not the case, you must destroy as many as you can, and suffer the rest to fly.


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The commanding officer will remain near his reserve, and if he has intelligence that the enemy are in expectation of being supported, he will cause the retreat to be founded, order his prisoners into the front, and move off before their reinforcement arrives.

If the enemy should have got possession of a village in your territories, and established themselves in such a manner as to render it very difficult to dislodge them, the only way to make them decamp is to set it on fire.

These attacks ought to be made in hazy or tempestuous weather, or before it is quite day light, but never in the dark, lest in the confusion you destroy your own people.

CHAP.



C H A P. XVIII.

The Conduct of an Officer, sent out to levy Contributions.

CONTRIBUTIONS are generally levied under one of the following circumstances: Either, being superior to the enemy, you cover the whole country; or you possess a part of it, till the arrival of the enemy; or you are interrupted by their light troops.

In the first case, it is common for the commander in chief to fix the sum to be raised by the inhabitants, under pain of military execution. Upon this duty the officer must vigorously exert his utmost authority to make his Hussars observe the strictest discipline and decorum, lest the inhabitants should be ruined beyond recovery.

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
The second case requires great circumspection in the officer, and a perfect knowledge of the country, that he may not be surprized by the unexpected arrival of the enemy; he must pre-determine his plan of retreat, and fix the place of general deposit; and for his farther security, he must advance small detachments towards the enemy, that he may have early notice of their approach, and to interrupt all communication with the inhabitants.

On his first arrival in the country, he will dispatch circulating billets of delivery, the duplicates of which are to be carried by the parties which are sent to levy the contributions. These parties are to have orders to return at a certain time, besides which they are to have sealed instructions, indicating the places of second and third rendezvous; but these orders are not to be opened unless in cases of necessity.

When

When contributions are to be raised in this manner, with the enemy at your heels, all lenity is out of the question. Where there is no coin to be had, you must take any thing that may be easily transported, or cattle, or hostages; but these only as your last resource. If you are close pressed by the enemy, it is best to divide your booty, and send it different roads, that you save at least some part of it.

In the third case, namely, where the enemy hinders the inhabitants from delivering their quota, the peasants are in great danger of total ruin. Nevertheless as the exigences of the army require it, you are to proceed with all possible rigour, and even to punish those who neglect to deliver their proportion at the time required, that the rest, thro' fear, may be more punctual in obeying the orders they have received.



C H A P. XIX.

The Conduct of an Officer sent out to reconnoitre, with a Command consisting of Infantry, Dragoons and Hussars.

THE Hussars, who are to reconnoitre on both sides the road as they proceed, are to be advanced about a quarter of a league before the Cavalry, which, if in an open country, must march in the center, followed by the Infantry, also at the distance of a quarter of a league.

If the enemy is encamped in an open country, it were best to traverse the plain with your Cavalry only, and to post your Infantry at the last *defilé*, ready to stop the enemy, in case your Cavalry should be pursued in the retreat.

If,

If, after having marched to a considerable distance, you perceive nothing of the enemy, and that it is necessary you should penetrate a wood, or pass a defilé, in order to have a view of their situation, tho' it may be attended with some danger; in this case, you are to halt your Cavalry in the plain, and pass the wood or defilé with your Infantry only. Your Cavalry will form in the mean time, ready to cover the Infantry in case of a precipitate retreat.

X It is an invariable maxim, for Cavalry to rally behind a defilé, and not before it.

If you take care to secure the passes, as you proceed, by small guards of Infantry, there is no danger of suffering in your retreat.

CHAP.

C H A P. XX.

On military Deception.

HAPPENING to fall in with a party of the enemy of superior force, it is often more adviseable to stand your ground, than to make a precipitate retreat: Your apparent resolution will stagger the enemy, and by artfully magnifying your party, you may possibly persuade him to move off.

In the first place, you must extend your line, by ordering the rear rank to double, and form upon one wing, while the other must be so situated, as to touch upon a wood or some inclosure, so as that its extremity may not appear. You will march a couple of horses between each division, which will appear to draw your field pieces.

Q

Your

Your Cavalry must form a rank entire, with a couple of files upon each wing, of two deep. But nothing will deceive the enemy so effectually, as your seeming resolution to engage. In the mean time, you must detach part of your Infantry to secure the nearest defilé in your rear ; the rest may then begin to file off gradually, with orders to quicken their pace as soon as they have lost sight of the enemy, and having given them sufficient time to reach the defilé, your Cavalry may retire as expeditiously as they please.

C H A P. XXI.

Conduct with regard to Prisoners, when there is a difficulty of conveying them.

OFFICERS may be released upon their parole of honour ; but before they are dismissed, they must sign an obligation to return, if required, and the eldest of them must certify the number of prisoners taken,

in order that an equal number may be returned in exchange. If the officers should refuse to do this, it will be just to treat them more rigorously, and even to threaten them with immediate death in case they do not comply.



C H A P. XXII.

Concerning the manner of reporting.

VERBAL reports being often inaccurately delivered, it is always most advisable to send them written: for this reason an officer on duty should never be without paper and a pencil in his pocket.

In cases that require immediate dispatch, you may send a verbal report first, which you ought to confirm by a written one, as soon as you have time.

In all reports you must endeavour to be explicit, yet concise; and without any other

Q 2

title

title at the top than the place, the day, and the hour.

An officer upon an out-command, after having reported facts and appearances, may be permitted to subjoin his conjectures concerning the intentions of the enemy, and may also indicate the manner in which he proposes to act.

All reports ought to be sealed, but where dispatch is required, they should not be retarded on that account.

Officers should accustom themselves to write reports without dismounting.

Officers, for their own credit, should be very careful how they report things, of which they are not sufficiently informed; and ought by no means to omit contradicting their intelligence, as soon as they discover their mistake.

If an officer should send frequent false reports, it will naturally be supposed, that he either wants experience, or courage, to examine things with his own eyes. In the first case, he ought not to be employed in matters of importance, till he has encreased his knowledge, but in the latter, he should be dismissed the service.



C H A P. XXIII.

On the Management of Horses.

THE preservation of your horses being extremely essential to the service, it is the duty of the officers to see that they are properly fed, and carefully attended.

As soon as a horse appears to be out of order, it must be immediately reported to the Captain.

If

If you are obliged to feed with rie, it should be mixed with an equal quantity of chopt straw.

You cannot give your horses too much hay, provided it be good. If you feed with oats, there is no necessity to mix it, tho' a little chopt straw will do no harm. I hold it best to feed often and little at a time.

You ought to be particularly careful that your forrage is not damaged, and that your chopt straw has not been used as litter.


You are to see that your horses are drest at least twice a day. If they are free from the strangles, it is not improper to bleed in spring and autumn.



F I N I S.


P1.I.

Advanced Guard.



P1.II.

Advancing in four Columns.



Retreat

Right Wing

Hussars 2 line of Cav. 2 line of Infant.

Right Wing

Huss. 1. l. of Cav. 1. l. of Inf.

Left Wing

Huss. 2 l. of Cav. 2 l. of Inf.

Left Wing

Huss. 1. l. of Cav. 1. l. of Inf.


Right



Wing

Hussars



Left

W.







Pl. VII.







Pl. VII.




Pl. VIII.










Caval.

Pl. XIII.



Pl. XIV.